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The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of 
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. . . .1 
 Milling among the tourists and homeless in Lafayette Park across 
from the White House in the mid-1980s was a protester carrying a sign with 
a unique political message: “Arrest Me. I Question the Validity of the Public 
Debt. Repeal Section 4, Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”2 
Although we can safely dismiss the protester’s tongue-in-cheek concern that 
§ 4 overrides the First Amendment, the mock protest makes two points 
worth noting. First, the wording of the first sentence of § 4 is open to a wide 
range of interpretation. And second, the section has become obscure, less 
likely to be cited in policy discussion3 than in a Washington joke. 
 “The validity of the public debt . . . shall not be questioned.” This 
Article argues that these words mean that the government must be able to 
meet its fiscal commitments and applies this interpretation to assorted 
aspects of congressional fiscal management. After all, some might say that 
since the 1980s, the congressional budget process itself has become a 
Washington joke. Congress and the President compete over budget policy in 
a high-stakes game of fiscal chicken.4 Deficits add to an accumulating debt5 
that is sure to escalate beyond the time horizons of balanced-budget plans.6 
And politicians agree only on the sanctity of entitlement spending,7 even as 
                                                 
1U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. Section 4 continues: 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but 
all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
2See Irvin Molotsky, Lafayette Park: Not Just Another Pretty Postcard, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
1984, at A13. 
3Indeed, the protester’s cryptic reference is the only citation of Section 4 in LEXIS/NEXIS’s 
New York Times database.  
4See Stephen Barr & Michael A. Fletcher, Government Shuts Again After Talks Collapse, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1995, at A1; Jackie Calmes & David Rogers, Federal Offices Are 
Preparing for Shutdown, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1995, at A2 (anticipating possibility of 
government shutdown and bond default). At the end of the latest impasse, Congress blinked. 
By then, the government had shut down twice, but avoided default on its bonds. See Monica 
Borkowski, The Budget Truce: Status Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1996, at A22; 
Christopher Georges, Congress Passes Debt-Ceiling Measure, Agrees to Spend More on 
Social Security, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1996, at A12. 
5The 1996 budget deficit has been projected at $144 billion. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1997-2006 at xviii (1996). 
6Both the President and Congress have unveiled plans that they claim would balance the 
budget by 2002. The Congressional Budget Office projects, however, that deficits will climb 
after 2002, especially beginning in about 2010 with the retirement of the baby-boom 
generation. See id. at xxv. 
7See, e.g., Robert Bixby, The Missing Debate: Hard Choices on Entitlements, ST. 
 
 
 
 PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE 4  
 
economists warn that the United States of the twenty-first century will be 
unable to deliver on its twentieth century promises.8 
 In short, the budget process needs mending.9 But in none of these 
areas does reform of congressional practice require a constitutional 
amendment10 or a sudden congressional commitment to fiscal soundness. 
Rather, reform can evolve from the first sentence of § 4, the Constitution’s 
Public Debt Clause.11 More prominent provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment have long overshadowed the Clause,12 assumed to be an 
anachronism13 from a war whose fiscal rifts healed faster than its emotional 
                                                                                                                  
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 1D. 
8See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 5, at xxiii (“The path of spending and 
revenues . . . clearly cannot be sustained because the debt-to-GDP ratio spirals out of control 
after 2030.”). 
9For an assessment of budget process reform proposals, see Philip G. Joyce & Robert D. 
Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 429 (1992). 
10The primary constitutional reform proposal has been the proposed Balanced Budget 
Amendment. See S.J. Res 1, 105th Cong. (1997); S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995). In 1995, 
the Amendment failed in the Senate, effectively one vote short of the needed two-third 
majority. See 141 CONG. REC. S3310-13 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1995). The subsequent 
November, 1996 elections led to an increase in the Republicans’ Senate majority, bringing 
speculation that a balanced-budget amendment might now have enough votes to pass that 
body. See Eric Pianin & Guy Gugliotta, Budget Amendment Gets Warmer Climate, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 11, 1996, at A4. The proposal, however, failed again by one vote. See 143 CONG. 
REC. S1922 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1997); David E. Rosenbaum, Republicans' Budget Amendment 
Is Headed for Defeat in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at A1 (reporting Sen. Robert 
Torricelli’s announcement reneging on campaign promise to support Balanced Budget 
Amendment). 
 Legal scholars have debated whether a Balanced Budget Amendment would be 
wise and effective. See Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment 
That Does What It Is Supposed To—And No More, 106 YALE L.J. 1449 (1997) (describing 
proposed Amendment as potentially unenforceable and as poorly drafted); Donald B. Tobin, 
The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Accountants? A Look at State 
Experiences, 12 J.L. & Pol. 153 (1996) (asserting that judicial intervention in budget matters 
will bring unintended consequences); Gay Aynesworth Crosthwait, Note, Article III 
Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1065 (1983); 
David Lubecky, Comment, The Proposed Federal  Balanced Budget  Amendment: The 
Lesson from State Experience, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 563 (1996) (comparing different states’ 
balanced budget amendments). 
11The provision is so obscure in Fourteenth Amendment scholarship that no commentator 
appears even to have taken the trouble to name it. In seeking to revitalize the Clause, this 
Article at least remedies this neglect. 
12Even at the turn of the century, treatises on the Fourteenth Amendment ignored the Clause. 
See, e.g., HENRY BRANNON, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1901) (quoting 
Fourteenth Amendment as containing only Sections 1 and 5). 
13In this sense, the Clause is assumed to be the Reconstruction analogue of a provision in the 
original Constitution: “All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the 
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this 
Constitution, as under the Confederation.” U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 1. Placing aside the 
possibility of a lingering debt from the eighteenth century, this provision is no longer 
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scars. While the Clause did arise in the peculiar context of Reconstruction, 
this Article argues that it remains applicable today and that it could 
transform the Fiscal Constitution14 by adding an intertemporal constraint to 
the budget process. This constraint would enhance congressional power by 
allowing Congress to tie its own hands with irrevocable budgetary 
promises,15 and accordingly would reduce Congress’s power by blocking it 
from repudiating or jeopardizing such commitments. 
 Part I argues that the Public Debt Clause applies beyond 
Reconstruction. Although there are few historical records available to help 
us discern the Framers’ intention, the history of the Clause’s adoption shows 
that Congress did not intend to limit its applicability to Civil War debt, but 
rather sought to embed fiscal honor within the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court has considered the Clause in just one case,16 but its decision in that 
case reaffirms the Clause’s vitality and legitimizes its future development. 
Part II argues for a broad reading of the Clause. The language and history of 
the Clause show that the “public debt” can include more than just bonds, 
and that formal repudiation need not occur for its validity to have been 
questioned. 
 Part III applies the Public Debt Clause to problems in the budget 
process.  The most obvious consequence of taking the Clause seriously 
would be that a governmental failure to make debt payments, which seemed 
possible during the budget impasse over the fiscal year 1996 budget, would 
be unconstitutional. More broadly, the Clause renders unconstitutional the 
federal debt-limit statute that makes default possible. Beyond fixing a 
broken budget process, the Public Debt Clause could serve as a partial 
                                                                                                                  
operative. However, the decision of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment not to echo 
this provision by using the phrase “before the Adoption of this article,” as they chose to echo 
other provisions in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, suggests that they sought to 
establish a broader principle in the first sentence of § 4. The second sentence of § 4, of 
course, has little applicability today. 
14For assessments of restrictions that the Constitution imposes on the budget process, see 
Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988); Kenneth Dam, The 
American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (1977). Professor Dam defines the 
“Fiscal Constitution” as including “Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution, 
key framework legislation, and implicit understandings derived from existing practice.” 
Dam, supra, at 271. The irony of this definition is that though it is part of the Constitution 
and relates to fiscal matters, the Public Debt Clause is not yet part of the Fiscal Constitution. 
15The economic notion that a government may benefit by “tying its hands,” i.e. providing an 
institutional mechanism that forces a government to stick to its initial policy commitments, 
has received more attention in the context of monetary than in the context of fiscal policy. 
See Robert Barro & David Gordon, Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of 
Monetary Policy, 12 J. MONETARY ECON. 101 (1983) (developing theory); Francesco 
Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, The Advantage of Tying One’s Hands: EMS Discipline and 
Central Bank Credibility, 32 EUR. ECON. REV. 1055 (1982) (applying theory to European 
Monetary System). 
16Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
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substitute for a Balanced Budget Amendment. More speculatively, the 
Clause might preclude repudiation of entitlement promises. 
 Without an enforcement mechanism, the unconstitutionality of 
various governmental practices under the Public Debt Clause would be 
irrelevant. Part IV addresses justiciability issues. By protecting bondholders, 
the Clause designates a class of individuals with standing to challenge the 
government’s compliance with the Clause. Other potential bars to 
jurisdiction, including sovereign immunity, the political questions doctrine, 
ripeness, and separation-of-powers considerations, do not preclude judicial 
involvement. 
 Some might say that the U.S. budgetary process has operated since 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in blissful ignorance of the Clause. 
Constitutional provisions can rise to prominence in unexpected ways, 
however, and public disgust with “government as usual”17 could make this 
an ideal time for enforcing the Clause. 
I. The Continuing Vitality of the Public Debt Clause 
 This Part shows that the Public Debt Clause established not a 
transitional rule for Reconstruction, but a fiscal constraint for all time. 
Section I.A uses historical evidence to argue that the Framers intended the 
Clause to be applicable beyond the Reconstruction period. Section I.B 
reviews the limited jurisprudence addressing the Clause and concludes that 
it does not contradict and may encourage a broad interpretation. Finally, 
Section I.C argues that desuetude has not sapped the Clause of its meaning, 
and that normative considerations may add additional support to this 
Article’s interpretation. 
A. The History of the Public Debt Clause 
 The Public Debt Clause emerged not from a congressional debate 
about the dynamics of the Fiscal Constitution, but from a Thirty-Ninth 
Congress focused on reconstructing a war-ravaged nation. It is not 
surprising then that no member of the House or Senate commented for the 
record18 on the Clause’s consequences for posterity.19 This lack of 
                                                 
17See, e.g., Brigid Schulte, Disgust at All-Time High, Polls Find, Knight-Ridder News 
Service, Dec. 19, 1995; Lee Walczak, The New Populism, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 
72 (assessing increasing distrust of politicians). 
18Aside from the Congressional Globe, which recorded statements on the floor of the House 
and Senate, the primary source of information about the Congress’s intent is BENJAMIN B. 
KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION (1914), 
which contains the proceedings of the joint House-Senate committee that produced an initial 
draft of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
19The limited discussion in Congress on the Fourteenth Amendment is a problem not just for 
Public Debt Clause scholarship, but for examinations of more prominent parts of the 
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articulation does not mean that the Framers sought to modify the 
Constitution for only the crisis at hand, as some have assumed.20 Rather, it 
demands attention to the evolution of § 4’s language and the context in 
which Congress crafted its words. Indeed, the only scholar to examine the 
Clause’s history tentatively concludes that “the intention was to lay down a 
constitutional canon for all time in order to protect and maintain the national 
honor and to strengthen the national credit.”21 In the context of the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has recognized the broad applicability 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The historical records suggest that 
Congress chose to do in the Public Debt Clause what it did in § 1 of the 
Amendment--set forth a general principle as applicable today as in 
Reconstruction. 
1. Evolution of the Clause in Congress 
 The present version of the Public Debt Clause emerged whole with 
little explanation during the final Senate floor debate on the Fourteenth 
Amendment.23 While the history is therefore insufficient to answer many 
questions about the provision,24 there are enough clues to justify confidence 
that the Clause applies to debts incurred after the Civil War. On its face, the 
provision appears to apply to the entire public debt, including war-related 
debts but not excluding other debts. Distinctions between the final wording 
and the language of earlier versions of § 4 suggest that the general wording 
was not accidental. In particular, the previous version of the Clause25 
                                                                                                                  
Amendment as well. See, e.g., JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 192 (1951) (“Considering the character of the contemplated action 
and the fact that a constitutional amendment was at stake, very little was said on the floor of 
either House, and what was said related primarily to the more obviously political sections of 
the proposal.”). 
20See, e.g., Arthur Nussbaum, Comparative and International Aspects of American Gold 
Clause Abrogation, 44 YALE L.J. 53, 85 (1934) (asserting that Public Debt Clause “does not 
seem to proclaim a principal [sic] of legal philosophy, but to envisage a particular situation 
existing at the time of its enactment (1866).”). Professor Nussbaum offered no evidence for 
his interpretation.  
21Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 15 
(1933). 
22See, e.g., San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1882) (repudiating 
theory that Equal Protection Clause related only to blacks). 
23See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040. The final language was drafted by Sen. 
Clark, who also synthesized the debt validity and debt repudiation provisions, which were 
previously two separate sections, into § 4. 
24As one scholar has concluded in reference to § 4, “We are on an uncharted sea and . . . it 
would be hazardous to venture on any dogmatic assertions.” Eder, supra note 21, at 4. 
25This version, approved during debate on June 4, 1866, read: “The obligations of the United 
States, incurred in suppressing insurrection, or in defense of the Union, or for payment of 
bounties or pensions incident thereto, shall remain inviolate.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2938-41. 
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unambiguously limited the Clause’s applicability to debts “incurred in 
suppressing insurrection.” The addition of the word “including” suggests at 
least a latent congressional preference for a provision of general 
applicability.  
  Indeed, § 4 had evolved to its present state through gradual steps of 
increasing generality. An early version26 of § 4 was clearly limited to 
repudiating the Confederate debt, reflecting the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction’s apparent lack of concern about the possibility that 
repudiation of Union debt was imminent.27 Congress tinkered with the 
provision, repudiating debt prospectively from any future insurrections 
instead of just from the “late rebellion.”28 More importantly, Congress added 
a separate sentence securing the validity of the Union debt.29 
Recommending this addition, Sen. Howard said that the provision “not only 
accepts honesty as a principle, but indorses [sic] it as the highest and best 
policy of the State as well as of individuals.”30  
 Though a last-minute substitution, the final version of the section 
hearkened back to the language of an earlier proposed version of the Public 
Debt Clause that never reached a vote in the Senate.31 This version is 
                                                 
26Sen. Howard initially proposed a debt repudiation provision as an independent 
constitutional amendment, which would read: 
That the payment of every kind of indebtedness arising or growing out of 
the late rebellion, contracted or accruing in aid of it or in order to 
promote it, is forever prohibited to the United States and to each of the 
states; such indebtedness and all evidences thereof are hereby declared 
and in all courts and places shall be held and treated as in violation of 
this Constitution, and utterly void and of no effect. 
KENDRICK, supra note 18, at 62.  
27The Committee, which had jurisdiction over questions related to the readmission of states, 
gave prominent consideration to debt issues generally in examining a draft of the proposed 
resolution to readmit Tennessee. The first section of the proposed resolution addressed debt 
issues, with secession and suffrage provisions relegated to the second through fourth 
sections. However, the Committee voted to amend the proposal by eliminating language 
preventing the state from repudiating “any debt or obligation contracted or incurred in aid of 
the Federal government against said rebellion . . . .” KENDRICK, supra note 18, at 69.  
28The change to general language was gradual; an April 20 version of the provision 
introduced by Rep. Stevens referred to “Debts incurred in aid of insurrection or of war 
against the Union.” Id. at 84. The final version replaces “the Union” with “the United 
States,” thus removing any doubt as to the applicability of the second sentence of § 4 to 
future rebellions. 
29See supra note 25. 
30CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3036. Sen. Howard also stated that the provision 
was “a proper precaution against the establishment of parties hereafter appealing to the 
sordid interests and lowest passions of men . . . .” Id. 
31The first sentence of the proposal read: 
The public debt of the United States, including all debts or obligations 
which have been or may hereafter be incurred in suppressing insurrection 
or in carrying on war in defense of the Union, or for payment of bounties 
or pensions incident to such war and provided for by law, shall be 
inviolable. 
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stylistically much closer to the final language than was the penultimate 
proposal.32 The drafter of the final version therefore probably used this 
earlier proposal rather than the penultimate proposal as a starting point. 
Therefore, where the meaning of the earlier proposal is clear and the final 
version appears to revert to this meaning, the earlier proposal and the final 
version probably share the same meaning. This inference is especially strong 
if the penultimate version clearly indicated a meaning different from both 
the earlier and final version.33 
 In fact, the earlier version differed from the penultimate in two 
critical ways that suggest it was intended to be generally applicable. First, 
the earlier version, like the final version, used the non-exclusive word 
“including” to place war debts within the broader category of the public 
debt. Second, the last two words of the earlier proposal are “be inviolable” 
rather than the retrospectively oriented “remain inviolate.” The statements of 
Sen. Wade in support of the earlier proposal also suggest an intent to embed 
in the Constitution a general economic principle.34 Because the earlier 
proposal was intended to apply beyond Reconstruction and the final version 
reverted to similar language, the final version too was probably generally 
applicable. The Congress drafting § 4 chose from a menu of linguistic 
variants. The subtle but clear distinctions in these variants suggest that 
Congress meant to make § 4 applicable beyond Reconstruction. 
 An argument against the applicability of the Public Debt Clause to 
post-Civil War Debt would likely focus on a single statement by the sponsor 
of the final language of § 4, agreeing that the new language did not change 
the effect of the provision.35 There are three reasons not to focus too much 
on this brief comment. First, stylistic changes in constitutional provisions 
                                                                                                                  
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768.  
32Compare supra text accompanying note 1, with supra note 25 (penultimate version), and 
supra note 31 (earlier version). 
33Ordinarily, evidence from drafts of statutory or constitutional provisions can cut two ways. 
Either the first version provides evidence of what the drafters meant in the second, or the 
change in language suggests that the drafters intended to change the underlying meaning. 
With the Public Debt Clause, however, the existence of a meaning shared by the first and 
three drafts and a different meaning in the second draft means that both inferences point in 
the same direction. Both the similarity between the first and third drafts and the difference 
between the second and third suggest that the drafters intended to recapture the original 
meaning and discard the second version’s meaning in the final version. 
34While Sen. Wade noted specially that the provision would put “the debt incurred in the 
civil war on our part under the guardianship of the Constitution,” he added that this would 
“give great confidence to capitalists and will be of incalculable pecuniary benefit to the 
United States.” Id. at 2769. In other words, the nation would benefit by increasing the 
security of its bond issues; this allows the country to borrow more cheaply in the future. This 
benefit is irrelevant for past debt accumulation, suggesting that Sen. Wade saw this version 
of the Public Debt Clause as providing a prospective benefit. 
35After Sen. Clark introduced the proposed substitute that was ultimately passed, Sen. 
Johnson said, “I do not understand that this changes at all the effect of the fourth and fifth 
sections. The result is the same.” Sen. Clark agreed, “The result is the same.” Id. at 3040. 
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are not generally assumed to be without substantive content and thus are not 
ignored in favor of penultimate drafts.36 Second, the senator’s statement may 
merely indicate that the versions would have the same result for the 
purposes of Reconstruction, since the generalization of the language would 
have impact only in future times. Third, the Senate rejected a subsequent 
proposal to revert the provision to its prior language.37 The significance of 
this rejection is unclear, because the proposal focused on changes other than 
the reversion of wording in § 4.38 However, the Senate had just voted to 
accept the current language, so an independent proposal to revert it would 
probably have failed. 
2. The Political and Economic Context of the Framing 
 Perhaps the Public Debt Clause has become obscure because § 4 
contains so many implicit references to the Civil War that readers may 
assume that Congress could not have been concerned about anything else in 
passing it. However, a congressional desire to impose a permanent 
prohibition against default makes sense in the economic and political 
context of Reconstruction. Economically, financial instruments were 
precarious in the 1860’s. The value of U.S. debt tumbled during the Civil 
War;39 while some of the decline may be attributable to the rising interest 
rates that accompanied the climb in the national debt, the bonds’ continuing 
decline in value as maturity approached suggests skittishness about the 
possibility that the United States might default.40 Congressmen professed the 
moral necessity of paying the debt,41 but perhaps they felt the need to do so 
partly because it was so high.42 A constitutional guarantee provided 
meaningful assurance to those who might purchase future government debt. 
                                                 
36See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1993) (rejecting argument that 
Committee of Style’s changes should be ignored in favor of second to last draft, because that 
would ignore Framers’ decision to pass final draft). 
37See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040. 
38Sen. Doolittle’s proposal would have both reverted the provision to its prior language and 
allowed states to ratify some but not all sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. The proposal 
was defeated, 33-11 with 5 absent. See id.  
39Ten-year, six-percent bonds issued in 1858 had declined in value 14% by 1861, 36% by 
1862, and 46% by 1864. See DOUGLAS B. BALL, FINANCIAL FAILURE AND CONFEDERATE 
DEFEAT 132 (1991).  
40See George T. McCandless, Jr., Money, Expectations, and the U.S. Civil War, 86 AM. 
ECON. REV. 661 (1996) (arguing that war news was primary determinant of value of Northern 
and Southern currency). 
41The House of Representatives had earlier voted 162-1 to approve a resolution calling the 
public debt “sacred and inviolate” and urging “that any attempt to repudiate or in any manner 
to impair or scale the debt, shall be universally discountenanced, and promptly rejected by 
Congress if proposed.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10. 
42The debt had climbed from $64.8 million in 1860 to $2.76 billion in 1866. See JAMES D. 
SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS & AMERICAN POLITICS 288 (1988).  
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 The Public Debt Clause also reflects the Thirty-Ninth Congress’s 
almost religious commitment to hard-money principles. The financial 
exigencies of the War had led to passage of the Legal Tender Acts43 and the 
resulting issue of greenbacks, though in ordinary fiscal times Treasury 
Secretary Chase and Congress would never have tolerated the distribution of 
Treasury notes not convertible to gold or silver.44 After the War, Congress 
passed a resolution, by a vote of 144-6, urging a return to the former 
monetary regime in which paper was backed by metal.45 Although the 
greenbacks’ convenience relative to bank drafts thwarted Congress’s 
resolution to cash them in,46 the Thirty-Ninth Congress surely remembered 
both the difficulty that the Treasury had experienced in borrowing money47 
and the wartime Congress’s fiscal gluttony. The Public Debt Clause served 
to demonstrate that Congress remained committed to sound financial 
management. 
 Underlying the Framers’ political concern in § 4 is the ironic 
electoral calculus that members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress faced. Victory 
on the battlefields did not bring political security to the Republicans, but 
rather the prospect that they might lose their hold on Congress. In freeing 
the slaves, the Emancipation Proclamation48 unraveled the Three-Fifths 
                                                 
43Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345; Act of July 11, 1862, ch. 142, 12 Stat. 532; Act 
of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 73, 12 Stat. 709.  
44See generally BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS 
IN THE CIVIL WAR 165-229 (1970) (describing Treasury and Congress’s reluctant accession to 
Legal Tender Acts); MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
150 (1970) (describing Chase as “a hard-money man, as suspicious of bank paper as Jackson 
and Benton had been”). Even after Treasury Secretary Chase became Chief Justice Chase, he 
never became entirely comfortable with the Legal Tender Acts, which the Supreme Court 
initially found unconstitutional in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), 
overruled by Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). See generally Kenneth W. 
Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367. 
45See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 75. 
46Congress faced “a sudden, impatient, popular belief--quite opposite to the Jacksonian hard-
money notions previously prevailing and to the intent of the war-time advocates of the notes-
-that an abundant currency based simply on federal credit and the country’s worth was 
required for the general good.” HAMMOND, supra note 44, at 253.  
47Because there had been no national bank since the Jackson Administration, the Lincoln 
Administration could not simply auction off debt to the highest bidder. Rather, the federal 
government resorted to commercial banks. Despite high levels of reserves, these banks were 
hesitant about lending to the federal government, because “they faced a revolutionary change 
in their business, with a different kind of borrower.” HAMMOND, supra note 44, at 76. The 
problem was exacerbated by federally imposed specie rules, which required the federal 
government to take physical control of gold when it borrowed, instead of merely receiving 
credit on the bank’s books like other borrowers. Id. at 59-70. The amount borrowed grew so 
high that the banks were unable to meet the government’s demand for specie, resulting in 
delays in the United States’s payment of creditors, employees, and suppliers. Id. at 162.  
48While the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1865 assured the immediate goal of the 
Proclamation itself, the purpose that unifies the various provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the securing of the remaining “fruits of the war.” See KENDRICK, supra note 
18, at 266-67 (listing civil rights and debt provisions among victory spoils that all 
 
 
 
 PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE 12  
 
Compromise49 and thus increased the population base that determined the 
South’s representation.50 Repudiation of rebel debt was consistent with 
Republican interpretations of existing law,51 but a Democratic Congress 
conceivably might have honored the debt or might even have repudiated the 
Union debt. To minimize the chance of a Democratic resurgence, the 
Congress included Sections 2 and 3 in the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Thus, 
the probability of repudiation of the Union debt in the absence of § 4 was 
small.53 But the insertion of the uncontroversial54 § 4 did more than provide 
insurance precluding a future Congress from retreating on the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress’s commitment to repay the national debt.55 Just as important, the 
provision cemented the North’s military victory with a rhetorical one by 
declaring Confederate obligations (and thus the Confederacy itself) “illegal 
and void” and by elevating the United States to the fiscal high road. 
                                                                                                                  
Republicans sought); see also TENBROEK, supra note 19, at 184 (noting that Congressmen 
wanted to place achievements of civil rights bills beyond reach of shifting Congressional 
majorities). 
49See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting slaves as three-fifths persons for purpose of 
representation in House). 
50Rep. Conkling estimated that the South would gain twelve representatives by 
Emancipation, in addition to the eighteen representatives that the South previously was 
allotted on account of its slave population. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 356-59 
(1866).  In addition, each rebel state’s entitlement to two senators upon readmission was 
beyond even the power of a constitutional amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. V (prohibiting 
amendments depriving unconsenting states of equal suffrage in Senate). 
51See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3036 (arguing that invalidity of rebel debt 
reflected common law principle that agreements founded on immoral consideration are 
unenforceable). Rep. Miller, however, had earlier noted that if the rebel states were 
considered to have left the Union and were then reannexed, principles of international law 
would demand assumption of the states’ debts. Id. at 2087.  
52Section 2 provided that representation in the House would be proportionately diminished 
when males over 21 years old were excluded from the franchise. Section 3 prohibited many 
Confederate officers and officials from membership in Congress. 
53Arguing against what became § 4, Sen. Saulsbury asked, “Does the Senator from Nevada 
say that the Democratic party of this country would, if they had it in their power, repudiate 
the national debt or would assume the confederate debt? I should like a frank answer.” Sen. 
Stewart of Nevada did not answer the question. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2800 
(1866). See also id. at 2940 (statement of Sen. Hendricks) (“Who has attacked public credit, 
or questions the obligation to pay the public debt?”). Testimony before the Joint Committee, 
however, indicated that Southerners hoped to repudiate the Union debt if the Democrats 
regained Congress, but would settle for like treatment of Union and Confederate debt. 
KENDRICK, supra note 18, at 283. 
54Section 4 was the subject of little comment on the floor of Congress largely because of its 
uncontroversiality. After extensive discussion of other provisions of the Amendment, Rep. 
Stevens noted simply, “The fourth section, which renders inviolable the public debt and 
repudiates the rebel debt, will secure the approbation of all but traitors.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3148; see also id. at 2530 (statement of Sen. Randall). 
55Congress acted on its intent to repay much of the Civil War debt at about the same time 
that it was considering the Fourteenth Amendment by passing a statute permanently 
appropriating funds to pay off much of it. See Act of May 2, 1866, ch. 70, § 2, 14 Stat. 41, 
41–42. 
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B. Jurisprudence on the Public Debt Clause 
 The Supreme Court has expounded on the Public Debt Clause just 
once, in Perry v. United States.56 Subsection I.B.1 narrates the facts and 
holding of the case, and Subsection I.B.2 argues that while Perry and 
subsequent decisions are inconclusive, they do not threaten and may 
strengthen the Clause’s vitality. 
1. Perry v. United States 
 Perry was one of the Gold Clause Cases, which concerned bonds 
issued by Congress that included a “gold clause” stipulating, “The principal 
and interest hereof are payable in United States gold coin of the present 
standard of value.”57  When gold subsequently appreciated vis-à-vis the 
dollar, Congress retreated, finding “payment in gold or a particular kind of 
coin or currency [to be] against public policy,”58 and providing for payment 
in dollars only. Perry, a bondholder, sued for the dollar equivalent of the 
gold he would have received at the earlier exchange rates. 
 The Supreme Court held the Public Debt Clause applicable: 
While this provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire 
to put beyond question the obligations of the Government 
issued during the Civil War, its language indicates a 
broader connotation. We regard it as confirmatory of a 
fundamental principle, which applies as well to the 
government bonds in question, and to others duly 
authorized by the Congress, as to those issued before the 
Amendment was adopted.59 
The Court used the Public Debt Clause as support for a structural argument 
that the Constitution did not allow the federal government to change the 
terms of its bonds. The Court rested most heavily on the clause of the 
unamended Constitution authorizing Congress “to borrow Money on the 
credit of the United States.”60 The Court noted, “The binding quality of the 
promise of the United States is of the essence of the credit which is so 
pledged. . . . ” Having this power to authorize the issue of definite 
obligations . . .  the Congress has not been vested with authority to alter or 
destroy those obligations.”61  
                                                 
56294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
57Id. at 347. 
58Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 48 Stat. 113. 
59294 U.S. at 354. 
60U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
61294 U.S. at 353. 
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2. Perry’s Jurisprudential Vitality 
 The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to reconsider 
Perry’s assessment of the Public Debt Clause, so it is unclear whether a 
future Court would agree that the Clause was applicable beyond the Civil 
War. An attack on Perry’s relevance would note a set of recent lower-court 
cases finding the Public Debt Clause inapplicable, the peculiar timing of 
Perry, and the decision’s primary reliance on the “borrow Money” Clause. 
None of these arguments seriously undermines Perry, however. In the end, 
of course, courts might or might not adopt this Article’s interpretation of the 
Clause, but there is nothing in the case law that would require a court to find 
the Clause inapplicable or to reject a broad reading of the Clause. 
 Several federal appellate courts in 1989–90 declined to apply the 
Clause in cases involving a federal program providing reinsurance to state-
designated student loan guarantee agencies.62 After Congress created new 
provisions with which several agencies failed to comply, the Secretary of 
Education withheld guarantee payments. Because the agreements with the 
agencies bound them to any changed statutes or regulations63 and allowed 
the Secretary to punish violations with such withholdings, the courts 
probably correctly found that no debt was violated.64 Commenting on the 
Clause, two appellate courts implied that it remained applicable,65 while two 
district courts noted the Clause’s Civil War origins and suggested it applied 
only to bond debt.66 None of the decisions carefully assesses the history or 
language of the Clause, so it is difficult to determine to what extent the 
courts would have agreed with this Article’s arguments. But no court argued 
that Perry should be overruled, thus suggesting that it remains good law. 
 Perry was decided at the height of the constitutional crisis between 
the Roosevelt Administration and the Court over new Deal legislation, two 
years before the “switch in time that saved nine.”67 In post-1937 cases, the 
Court backed away from earlier activist stances limiting the government’s 
                                                 
62See Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1990); Ohio Student 
Loan Comm’n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court application 
of Clause); Colorado v. Cavazos, Civ. A. No. 88-C-207, 1990 WL 367621 at *5 (D. Colo. 
Aug. 21, 1990); Delaware v. Cavazos, 723 F. Supp. 234 (D. Del. 1989), aff’d 919 F.2d 137 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
63See, e.g., Great Lakes, 911 F.2d at 12 n.1. 
64This accords with an interpretation of the Clause as allowing Congress to reserve the right 
to modify its debt. See infra Section II.C. 
65See Great Lakes, 911 F.2d at 17 (“This section is only brought into play when some state 
or federal government agency questions a debt.”); Ohio Student Loan, 900 F.2d at 902 
(“[B]ecause we find no abrogation of the ‘contract’ in the instant case, we conclude that there 
was no violation of section four of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
66See Colorado v. Cavazos, 1996 WL at *5; Delaware v. Cavazos, 723 F. Supp at 244–45. 
67See generally David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 
1931–1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504 (1987) (discussing Court activism and retrenchment). 
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ability to craft economic policy.68 But this Article’s reading of the Public 
Debt Clause is hardly comparable to the Court’s activist interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Moreover, the Perry Court 
appeared determined not to upset governmental policy and ultimately did 
not award Perry damages. Because there was no free domestic market for 
gold, the majority reasoned, Perry would not have been able to sell any gold 
on the hypothetical world market on which his calculations were based.69  
 That the Perry Court’s analysis of the Public Debt Clause was one 
support for a broader argument that the Constitution precludes debt 
repudiations does not narrow its relevance. Just because there are additional 
reasons that the repudiation in Perry was unconstitutional does not change 
that, according to the Court, the Public Debt Clause confirmed the 
unconstitutionality of repudiation. Moreover, although Perry concerns only 
direct repudiation of bonds, its holding lends credence to Part II’s expansive 
interpretation of the Public Debt Clause. For if the Constitution already 
banned debt repudiation, then restricting the Public Debt Clause to outright 
repudiation of bonds, rather than allowing it to encompass non-bond 
obligations or extend to actions placing debts into question, would be 
redundant. 
C. Interpreting the Public Debt Clause Today 
 This Part so far has engaged originalist, textualist, and precedential 
methodologies to interpret the Public Debt Clause. There are many 
approaches to constitutional interpretation, however, and the Clause may be 
vulnerable to minimalist construction by those who would assess it by 
relying on historical practice or on normative considerations. After all, 
Perry was the only exception to the otherwise uneventful history of the 
Clause, and though Part III of this Article suggests that the Clause could 
reform the budget process, the practices that may need reform have long, 
largely unquestioned histories. Moreover, if the Public Debt Clause would 
disturb the tranquil continuity of these practices, perhaps it is best to leave it 
alone. Both of these claims are contestable, however, and the following two 
subsections address critiques of the Public Debt Clause that focus on 
desuetude or on normative considerations.  
                                                 
68See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("We have returned to the original 
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for 
the judgment of legislative bodies . . . ."). 
69Id. at 357. Four dissenters argued that the government ought to pay damages. Id. at 369-70 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). See also Currie, supra note 67, at 536 n.161 (calling finding of 
no damages “bizarre”). 
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1. Desuetude 
 Concerns about desuetude are generally less applicable in a 
constitutional context than in a statutory one.70 When a statute falls into 
disuse, it may no longer reflect the consensus of society.71 Constitutional 
provisions are inherently countermajoritarian, binding one generation to at 
least the words chosen by another. In addition, while an outdated criminal 
law may be enforced arbitrarily,72 this danger does not inhere in 
constitutional law. Perhaps recognizing these arguments, the Supreme Court 
has held that longstanding government practice does not waive a 
constitutional violation.73  
 In some contexts, the potentially destabilizing nature of 
constitutional adjudication presents a unique desuetude concern not 
generally applicable to statutory construction,74 but revitalization of the 
Public Debt Clause does not threaten the existing constitutional order. 
Active reconsideration of some obscure constitutional provisions might be 
dangerous because those provisions are so open-ended that if the courts 
were to consider them, damaging uncertainty about the structure of 
government would result. For example, the Constitution’s Guarantee 
Clause75 could conceivably be interpreted to disallow a wide range of state 
practices viewed as undemocratic.76 Even if such an interpretation were 
correct, adjudication of such claims could mean that the structure of state 
governments would be modified whenever the composition of the Supreme 
Court changed and constitutional doctrine surrounding the Clause evolved. 
Such considerations may underlie the Supreme Court’s holdings that 
                                                 
70For arguments that obsolescent statutes should be nullified because of desuetude, see 
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Corey R. Chivers, 
Desuetude, Due Process, and the Scarlet Letter Revisited, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 449. 
71See CALABRESI, supra note 70, at 2, 21. 
72See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 153 (1962) (arguing that obsolete statutes are subject to 
discriminating enforcement). 
73See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 (1983). 
74Destabilization was potentially of particular concern in Chadha, because a wide range of 
statutory schemes assumed the constitutionality of the legislative veto, but the Court found 
the veto unconstitutional nonetheless. 
75U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”) 
76See, e.g., Debra F. Salz, Note, Discrimination-Prone Initiatives and the Guarantee Clause: 
A Role for the Supreme Court, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 100 (1993) (arguing that Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 violated the Guarantee Clause); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Central 
Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the 
Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994) (“The concept [of Republican 
Government] is indeed a spacious one, and many particular ideas can comfortably nestle 
under its big tent.”). 
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Guarantee Clause claims are not justiciable.77 Because passage of a statute 
requires the approval of both houses of Congress and approval by the 
President (or a veto override), congressional resolution of Guarantee Clause 
claims may be more final than Supreme Court rulings, and it may therefore 
be wise for the courts not to hear constitutional claims where finality in 
constitutional principle is particularly important.78 Even more importantly, 
an invalidation of a state practice might lead to questioning of statutes 
passed as a result of that practice, leading to considerable confusion. 
 Though the Public Debt Clause could help shape the Fiscal 
Constitution, its potential is not destabilizing. A ruling that a particular 
statute violated the Public Debt Clause would result simply in the 
invalidation of that statute. The Public Debt Clause implicates the powers of 
Congress, but not the structure of government, and it thus has no more 
destabilizing potential than any other constitutional provision. In addition, 
the Clause protects against government action that presumably would occur 
rarely even in the Clause’s absence. That the Supreme Court has not 
regularly applied the Clause does not mean that Congress has relied on its 
ability to ignore its debt obligations; to the contrary, the Clause’s dormancy 
indicates that Congress generally has recognized its moral, and perhaps 
constitutional, duty to pay its debts. 
2. Normative Arguments 
 Normative concerns need not entrench the status quo, and there is 
thus no reason to assume that it is best to leave government running as it 
has. A full normative assessment of a principle requiring the government to 
follow through on its fiscal promises is beyond the scope of this Article. The 
basic case for such a provision, however, is simple: By allowing Congress to 
tie its own hands, the Clause increases the credibility of congressional 
promises and improves the nation’s credit rating. People will be less 
inclined to hold and purchase government debts if they believe that the 
government will not honor those obligations.79 
                                                 
77See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding that determination of which of 
two rival claimants was rightful government of Rhode Island required congressional 
resolution); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (reaffirming that 
Guarantee Clause claims are not justiciable); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 
253 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that political questions doctrine is based on 
prudential concerns). 
78The counterargument is that the Supreme Court may decline to overrule constitutional 
holdings where there is a strong social interest in finality. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
503 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (arguing that constitutional stare decisis has particular force where 
a “rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences 
of overruling”). 
79The counterargument is also simple: What happens if Congress ties its hands and lives to 
regret it? Under this Article’s interpretation of the Public Debt Clause, Congress must refrain 
from crafting policies that would violate the Clause, even if those policies would be in the 
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 Moreover, this Article is premised on a belief that several areas of 
congressional budget practice require reform. Admittedly, this normative 
basis is not perfectly aligned with the values that the Public Debt Clause 
protects. In a sense, Part III uses the principle of fiscal honor as the fount of 
a legal argument for the related but distinct principle of sound fiscal 
management. A normative argument against either principle might provide a 
counterweight to this Part’s historical and textual interpretation of the Public 
Debt Clause, but accepting these principles adds purpose and urgency to this 
Part’s historical and textual interpretations.  
II. The Meaning of the Public Debt Clause 
 The history of the Public Debt Clause contributes only to an 
understanding of the temporal scope of the provision. Assuming the Clause 
remains in force today leaves additional questions: What constitutes the 
“public debt”? And what type of action entails a questioning of the debt’s 
validity? These questions, never addressed in a committee report or on the 
floor of the Senate, are inherently difficult. One response might be to 
construe the Public Debt Clause as narrowly as possible,80 but the language 
of § 4, literally read using standard principles of construction,81 demands a 
broad application. As Section II.A argues, the Clause encompasses not just 
bonds, but also any financial obligation stemming from an agreement. 
Meanwhile, Congress need not repudiate a debt to trigger the Clause; 
Section II.B shows that if Congress indirectly makes it so that a debt will not 
be paid, it has violated the Clause. 
                                                                                                                  
national interest. Ultimately, a full normative assessment of the Clause requires balancing its 
benefits in improving congressional credibility and its costs in restricting Congress’s policy 
options. 
80The narrowest possible construction of Public Debt Clause would read it out of the 
Constitution altogether, by applying it only to Civil War debt. The Supreme Court, of course, 
has never adopted the principle that ambiguity should always be resolved by limiting 
constitutional provisions’ scope to circumstances that they unambiguously cover. Cf. 1 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 405 (1870) (noting need to resolve 
ambiguities in Constitution by selecting interpretation that “best harmonizes with the nature 
and objects, the scope and design of the instrument.”).  
81This Section adopts three interpretive principles to resolve ambiguity. First, interpretations 
that would read words or phrases out of the Clause are rejected in preference for 
interpretations that consider the meaning of each word. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is 
intended to be without effect . . . .”). Second, the presence of a particular word or phrase in 
the Clause leads to the assumption that the Framers intended to use that word rather than 
another that would correspond to an alternative reading. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 433 n.12 (1987) (noting strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent 
through language it chooses). Third, the meaning of words is construed by reference to the 
surrounding words. See, e.g., Neal v. Clarke, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (discussing canon 
known as noscitur a sociis). 
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A. Obligations Included Within the Public Debt 
 To the modern economist, the words “public debt” may connote 
only bond obligations; in today’s budget process, “public debt” is a 
technical term with a narrow scope.82 Black’s Law Dictionary, however, 
defines the public debt as “[t]hat which is due or owing by the government 
of a state or nation,”83 and the words of the Public Debt Clause suggest that 
the Framers were protecting a similarly broad class of obligations. A key to 
understanding the scope of the provision lies in the phrase, “including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion.” The use of the word “including” rather than “in 
addition to” or “and of” shows that the enumerated rebellion-related debts84 
delineate the expanse of the phrase “public debt” rather than annexing an 
additional category of “debts” to it. In other words, the “including” phrase 
indicates that the Framers conceived the “public debt” as including not just 
financial instruments, but also such promises as war pensions and 
bounties.85 This interpretation is further supported by the use of the words 
“debts incurred” rather than, for example, “notes and contracts.” The word 
“debts” draws a parallel with the phrase “public debt,” suggesting that the 
Framers naturally thought of pensions and bounties as being part of the 
“public debt.” 
 This Article construes the “public debt” to include the ordinary 
pensions of government employees and similar government commitments. 
                                                 
82The federal government currently defines “public debt” to include only bond obligations 
issued by the Treasury; debt issued by administrative agencies is tallied separately as 
“agency debt.” See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 188 (1995) [hereinafter 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES]. 
83BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 404 (6th ed. 1990). See also Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 
How.) 272, 284 (1850) (defining “public debt” as including “debts of every description, 
without reference to their origin.”). 
84One might construe the phrase “pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion” by applying the “for” phrase to the word “bounties” but not to 
“pensions.” This approach would be consistent with the general interpretive rule that a phrase 
applies only to its immediate antecedent. See, e.g., Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 877 
(4th Cir. 1996). This interpretation would mean that even if the public debt did not ordinarily 
include pensions, these are specifically protected by the Public Debt Clause, whether or not 
insurrection-related. However, this construction seems forced, considering the parallelism of 
the words “pensions” and “bounties.”  
85The irony of this interpretation is that the presence of the “including” phrase may explain 
why those not scrutinizing § 4 might conclude that the entire section is no longer relevant. 
The reference to insurrection or rebellion connects the Public Debt Clause with the second 
sentence of § 4, which no longer is generally applicable. But once it is conceded that the 
words “validity of the public debt” have general applicability, as argued in Section I.A, 
supra, the “including” phrase may be seen as narrowing rather than widening the Public Debt 
Clause only if the enumerated items are read exclusively. Such a reading is implausible, 
however, since the Clause surely encompasses at least formal debt instruments, which are not 
specifically enumerated in the “including” phrase.  
 
 
 
 PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE 20  
 
This construction might appear to read out of the Clause the phrase limiting 
pensions and bounties to those incurred in suppressing insurrection. This 
language was essential, however, because the South claimed that secession 
was legal and the suppression of it illegal. Without an unambiguous 
syntactic indication that the war-related debts were part of the public debt 
authorized by law, the Public Debt Clause would have left open the 
possibility that a Democratic Congress could have repudiated the Union’s 
Civil War bonds as illegal and not part of the public debt. This appears to 
explain the awkward location of “authorized by law” in between the 
“including” phrase and “the public debt of the United States.”86 The Framers 
sought with that location to clarify that the Civil War origins of “pensions 
and bounties” would not keep them out of the “public debt.” 
 The phrase “authorized by law” and the word “debt” provide 
plausible limits on the scope of the Public Debt Clause; while Part III of this 
Article does not depend on these limits, it is useful to see that this Part’s 
construction of the Clause need not radically change the legal order by 
forcing Congress to follow through on all of its earlier intentions. First, a 
governmental promise is “authorized by law” only if it is contained in a 
congressional statute.87 Second, a debt is “[a] sum of money due by certain 
and express agreement.”88 Applying this definition to the Public Debt 
Clause, the United States incurs a public debt only if a statute embodies an 
agreement, or, more restrictively, only if the government issues a written 
agreement.89 Since a gratuitous promise does not ordinarily constitute a 
legally enforceable agreement, the Clause could be further limited to 
                                                 
86If “authorized by law” were moved after the “including” phrase, it could be seen as a limit 
on the scope of “pensions and bounties.”  
87The phrase “authorized by law” thus applies a common-sense limitation to the Public Debt 
Clause that is also found in the law of government contracts, declaring contracts signed by 
government employees unenforceable if those employees were unauthorized to sign them. 
See, e.g., United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In addition, the 
omission of the words “or equity” reinforces the Public Debt Clause’s exclusion of 
obligations or claims.  
 An alternative construction of the phrase “authorized by law” would be that the 
phrase restricts the Clause’s applicability to those debts that had already been authorized 
before the Amendment’s adoption. Two factors militate against this reading. First, the phrase 
“authorized by law” is more naturally construed as a present participial phrase. Cf. Linsalata 
v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defining phrase “authorized by law” in 
contractual context to contemplate subsequently enacted statutes). Second, if the Framers had 
intended explicitly to limit the Clause’s temporal applicability, they could easily have 
indicate this intent clearly, for example with the phrase “heretofore accumulated.”  
88BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (6th ed. 1990). 
89This restriction suggests that the government cannot become an involuntary debtor for 
Public Debt Clause purposes through commission of a tort on an individual with which it 
does not have a contract. In other words, the Public Debt Clause does not override the 
government’s sovereign immunity in tort suits, cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 
(1953) (accepting statutory immunity of United States in tort suit), or require that the 
government become an involuntary debtor. 
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governmental promises made in exchange for good consideration.90 The 
requirement of an agreement honors § 4’s distinction among debts, 
obligations and claims. While the Public Debt Clause itself uses only the 
word “debt,” the second sentence of § 4 uses the terms “debt or obligation” 
and the phrase “claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave.” By 
including only the first of these within the public debt, the Public Debt 
Clause excludes money that the United States ought to pay by virtue merely 
of a moral obligation.91 
B. Congressional Actions Triggering the Clause 
 Once Congress makes a promise that becomes part of the public 
debt, its “validity . . . shall not be questioned.”92 But questioned by what? A 
nihilistic interpretation would append to the Clause “by this Section,” thus 
reducing it to a nullity, but the language of § 4 makes this construction 
insupportable.93 A better interpretation, therefore, is that no state action may 
question a debt’s validity. This does not resolve, however, what 
“questioned” means. Dismissing the Lafayette Park protester’s interpretation 
of the word leaves two possibilities. “To question” could mean either “to 
repudiate” or “to jeopardize.” As will become clear in Part III, this 
distinction is important. The following subsection conceptualizes the choice 
between these alternatives, and the three subsections that follow mount an 
affirmative case for the preferability and the manageability of the latter. 
                                                 
90Thus, a statute providing all Californians with a written promise of annual payments of 
$500 in perpetuity might not create a public debt.  
91This analysis does not resolve the question of whether a moral obligation may rise to the 
level of a moral consideration by virtue of a Congressional statute. For example, if Congress 
had passed a statute promising to give $500 monthly to Oliver Sipple, credited with saving 
the life of President Ford, would that promise have become part of the public debt? See, e.g., 
Hawkes v. Saunders, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1782) (providing classic statement of “moral 
consideration” contract doctrine).  
92The language echoes the words of the Speech and Debate Clause: “The Senators and 
Representatives shall . . . be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of 
their respective Houses . . . and for any Speech or debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Whether this 
was intentional or coincidental, it does not much help, since questioning a congressman does 
not seem analogous to questioning the public debt.  
93First, it is implausible that the Framers could have seen the need to clarify that the second 
sentence of § 4 does not invalidate the Union debt, since that sentence clearly invalidates 
only debts “incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States.” Second, the 
use of the imperative “shall” instead of “is” removes the possibility that the first sentence of 
§ 4 merely comments on the second. 
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1. Possible Levels of Generality 
 The question is at what level of generality the Framers drafted the 
Public Debt Clause.94 A provision protecting only Civil War Union debt 
would be a low level of generality. By establishing that the Clause does not 
apply only to Civil War debt, Section I.A rejected this possibility. An 
intermediate level of generality would be a permanent ban on governmental 
failure to honor debts. Finally, a high level would be a prohibition not only 
of governmental failure to make payments on a debt, but also of government 
action that will ultimately lead to such failure.95 Only the high level comes 
into play when Congress passes a statute that will cause default on a debt 
unless a future Congress changes the statute.96  
 The following subsections argue for the high level of generality by 
discussing the Clause’s language and historical context. Three factors 
should be kept in mind in assessing this evidence. First, as defined so far, 
“jeopardization” and “repudiation”97 differ only in timing: Congress 
jeopardizes debts as soon as it places the government on the road to default, 
but repudiation occurs only once Congress fails to change course and the 
government reaches the end of that road. There are, however, other ways 
one might define “repudiation,” and thus other ways to conceptualize the 
difference between the intermediate and high levels of generality. In 
particular, “repudiation” could refer to government action that intentionally 
leads to debt nonpayment.98 However, there is no reason to read an 
                                                 
94Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1926–28 (1995) (discussing level-of-generality 
problem in context of Equal Protection Clause). 
95At an even higher level of generality would be a general requirement of sound financial 
management, but this is clearly too general because the text of the Clause is concerned only 
with “the public debt.” Part II of this Article attempts to achieve some aspects of this general 
goal by identifying practices threatening the validity of the debt. This Article does not attack 
other governmental practices that might be fiscally undesirable, such as taxation policies that 
arguably discourage savings, because these practices are unrelated to the public debt. 
96For example, suppose Congress were to repeal a statute providing for the automatic 
payment of a debt due a number of years hence. Under the high level of generality, the 
statute would be unconstitutional, since it jeopardizes the debt by depending on a future 
Congress to unrepeal the statute. Under the intermediate level of generality, the repeal statute 
is constitutional; an unconstitutional event would occur only once the government failed to 
restore the statute in time to make the payment. 
97This Article uses these words as shorthand references for the timing distinction, but 
different definitions of these words are possible. For example, “repudiation” might be 
defined to occur only when a statute explicitly states that a debt will not be paid. Under this 
definition, repudiation would occur in the example of note 96 as soon as the repeal statute 
was passed. But if the government failed to make a payment even though a statute required 
it, that would not constitute repudiation under this definition. Though this is a plausible 
definition of “repudiated,” it is not a plausible interpretation of “validity . . . shall not be 
questioned.” See also infra note 110; infra Subsection II.B.2.c. 
98“Repudiation” might also refer to action directly leading to debt nonpayment. However, 
assessing the directness of a congressional action’s effect on debt really involves assessing 
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intentionality requirement into the Public Debt Clause, especially since 
assessment of congressional motive is a disfavored method of 
interpretation.99 Moreover, much of the evidence that militates against the 
intermediate level of generality as defined above also militates against 
alternative definitions of the intermediate level.100 
 Second, there is no smoking gun. Probably, the Framers did not 
consider the distinction between the intermediate and high levels directly, 
and the proper inquiry is thus which level of generality is more consistent 
with the tenor of the Clause and the purposes of Congress. The answer turns 
in part on whether Congress envisioned the Clause as a technical rule 
allowing bond-holders to recover in court after missed debt payments or as a 
more amorphous commitment by the government to ensuring the debt’s 
validity. If the Framers intended the Clause only as a technical ban on 
nonpayment, the intermediate level of generality is the right one. But if the 
Framers intended it as a statement of a broad principle constraining 
Congress, the high level is preferable, because that level identifies a 
violation of the Clause when Congress contravenes the principle rather than 
when this contravention affects debt-holders.101 
 Third, it is important to avoid making reflexive assumptions. There 
is no default rule that constitutional provisions should be interpreted as 
narrowly as possible. The advocate of the high level of generality would 
bear the burden of proof only if there were some a priori evidence 
suggesting that the Framers intended the Public Debt Clause to be narrow.102 
                                                                                                                  
timing and intentionality. Saying that a congressional action directly affects a debt means 
either that the action affects the debt right away or that Congress meant to legislate about 
debt rather than about something else. While the word “directness” might refer to some 
combination of these, there is no reason to consider directness independently of timing and 
intentionality issues. 
99See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508 (1975) (“Our 
cases make clear that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we do not look to 
the motives alleged to have prompted it.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84 
& 383 n.30 (noting that Court will generally avoid inquiry into congressional intent in 
constitutional cases because different legislators may have different motives in passing 
legislation). 
100See infra notes 104, 107, and 112; text accompanying notes 115–116 and 121–122. 
101A ban on nonpayment furthers the principle of debt validity, but not enough to meet the 
demands of a general principle. If Congress fails to ensure the validity of debts, the courts 
might be unable to help, and the need to resort to the courts undermines confidence in debt 
issues. See infra note 118. Moreover, assuming that Congress did not have a specific 
technical ban in mind, there is no reason to read into the Clause a distinction between actions 
repudiating and actions jeopardizing debts. Both type of actions mean that Congress has 
failed to ensure the debt’s validity, and restricting the Clause to the former entails an 
assumption that the Clause directly constrains the courts but not Congress. 
102If one were (foolishly) to guess at a level of generality without looking at the Clause’s 
language or history, the high level would seem more plausible than the intermediate. First, 
the fact that the Framers clearly rejected the low generality level suggests a preference for 
more general provisions. Second, the Framers wrote § 1 of the Amendment at perhaps the 
broadest level of generality imaginable. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
 
 
 
 PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE 24  
 
2. Linguistic Evidence 
 The words of the Public Debt Clause are consistent with an 
interpretation that bars statutes jeopardizing the validity of debts. First, the 
verb “to question” is closer to the verb “to jeopardize” than it is to the verb 
“to repudiate.” Second, the passive construction of the words “shall not be 
questioned” indicates an intent to inspire confidence in bond-holders that the 
government will take no action interfering with their debts. Third, the word 
“validity” implies that the government’s obligation to ensure its credit 
extends over the entire time period during which debt obligations are being 
held. Fourth, the evolution of the Clause suggests that the Framers chose the 
Clause’s words deliberately. The following subsections consider in turn 
these linguistic reasons for preferring the high generality level interpretation 
of “validity . . . shall not be questioned.” 
a. Meaning of “to Question” 
 The verb “to question” would be an odd synonym for “to 
repudiate.” Questioning a proposition is not equivalent to insisting that the 
proposition is false but merely entails suggesting that it might be. To say, “I 
question whether your debt will be honored,” is different from saying, 
“Your debt will not be honored.” Analogously, to say that a statute must not 
question a debt’s validity is different from saying that a statute must not 
repudiate a debt.103 Intuitively, the verb “to question” is much closer to the 
verb “to undermine” than it is to the alternative “to cancel.”104 Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                  
427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) ("[T]he 39th Congress was intent upon establishing in the federal 
law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular and 
immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves."). The Framers not only did not limit § 1 
to a constitutionalization of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but did not even limit the Equal 
Protection Clause to protecting blacks. Of course, this is hardly conclusive about § 4. But it 
suggests that any reflex to assume that provisions were meant narrowly is particularly 
inappropriate in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional provision. 
103For another analogy, consider Justice Brandeis’s famous remark: “When the validity of an 
act of the Congress is drawn in question . . . this Court will first ascertain whether a 
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). While the similarity in language to the Public Debt Clause is almost surely 
coincidental, this quotation helps reveal what it means to question something’s validity. 
Justice Brandeis of course did not mean that a statute should be narrowly construed when a 
constitutional provision has made it unambiguously of no force; he meant that when it 
seemed there might be an issue of constitutionality, the Court would try to avoid that issue. 
Likewise, the Public Debt Clause is triggered not only when the government has made it 
absolutely clear through a failure to make payment that a debt will not be honored, but also 
when the government’s actions effectively raise the issue. 
104In addition, nothing in the verb “to question” makes it more like “to undermine 
intentionally” than like “to undermine inadvertently.” True, the sentence “I question the 
debt,” makes it sound like I am questioning the debt intentionally. But that is only because 
the verb has a subject. See infra note 107. By contrast, the phrase “the debt is now 
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literal interpretation of the Clause is that a governmental action making 
uncertain whether or not a debt will be honored is unconstitutional.105  
b. Passive Construction 
 The passive construction of the phrase “shall not be questioned” 
provides additional evidence about how the Framers conceptualized the 
Public Debt Clause and thus helps explain why the Framers used the word 
“questioned.” The Framers were not fond of the passive voice; indeed, the 
Joint Committee voted to change a passive version of what became the 
second sentence of § 4 to the active voice.106 Passive sentences are useful for 
authors who do not wish to restrict a verb to a particular subject. If the 
Framers meant only that the United States must not question the validity of 
its debts, they could have used the compact phrase, “The United States shall 
not question the validity of its public debt . . . .” While the Clause surely 
means at least this, it might also convey, “the validity of the public debt . . . 
shall not be questioned by the people.”  
 The passive construction thus allows for a reading of the Clause as 
containing a reassuring promise from the Framers to bondholders. 
Moreover, the passive language makes the Clause more evocative than 
descriptive, more like an announcement of a general principle of debt 
validity than like a technical rule barring failure to make debt payments. It 
would be inconsistent with this promissory announcement and with the 
word “questioned” if a statute could cause bondholders to believe that their 
debts will not be paid as promised and that they will need to seek redress in 
the courts to recover belated payment.107 
c. The Word “Validity” 
 A debt does not become valid or invalid only at the moment 
payment is due. A debt’s validity may be assessed at any time, and a debt is 
valid only if the law provides that it will be honored.108 Therefore, a 
                                                                                                                  
questioned” does not imply that anyone intended the act that caused the questioning. 
105A counterargument might charge that the Framers used the verb “to question” as a 
restrained way of saying “to repudiate.” This is a weak counter, because its only impetus is 
an assumption that the Framers must have meant to preclude only direct repudiation, the 
meaning of the words of the Clause notwithstanding. 
106See KENDRICK, supra note 18, at 103.  
107Conceiving of the Clause as containing a promise to debtholders also problematizes a 
reading of the Clause as prohibiting only congressional acts intentionally leading to 
nonpayment. Debtholders would care not about whether Congress meant to place their debts 
into question, but about whether they could count on receiving payment. If the Clause means 
that debtholders shall have no reason to question their debts—a meaning which the passive 
construction allows—then there is no reason to limit the Clause with an intentionality 
requirement. 
108Among the legal definitions of “valid” is “sustainable and effective in law, as 
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requirement that the government not question a debt’s validity does not kick 
in only once the time comes for the government to make a payment on the 
debt. Rather, the duty not to question is a continuous one. If government 
actions make it so that a debt will not be paid absent future governmental 
action, that debt is effectively invalid.109 The intermediate level of generality 
recognizes that instead of referring to payment of debts, the Clause bans 
government action at any time that affects the validity of debt instruments. 
  The word “validity” indicates that not merely the existence of the 
public debt, but also its binding force on the government “shall not be 
questioned.”110 The government thus may not acknowledge that the public 
debt exists but refuse to pay it. If the government fails to make a debt 
payment, the debt instrument is at least temporarily invalid for legal 
purposes.111 Moreover, there is no such thing as a valid debt that will 
nonetheless not be honored; a debt cannot be called “valid” if existing laws 
will cause default on it.112 So as soon as Congress passes a statute that will 
lead to default in the absence of a change of course, the debt is invalid (or at 
least of questionable validity) and Congress has violated the Public Debt 
Clause. 
                                                                                                                  
distinguished from that which exists or took place in fact or appearance, but has not the 
requisites to enable it to be recognized and enforced by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1440 (6th ed. 1990). None of the definitions of “valid” suggests that the attribute of validity 
exists only at the time of contract performance or debt payment. Therefore, government 
action may constitute validity questioning not only when the government fails to make a 
payment, but also when action brands a debt invalid. 
109The Public Debt Clause does not distinguish debts that are invalid for all practical 
purposes from debts that the law explicitly brands as invalid. The word “validity” does not 
implicitly contain such a distinction, and it is not modified by the word “legal.” Reading the 
distinction into the Clause would allow the government to pass one statute providing that 
debts shall be legally valid, but another providing that the Treasury must not make payment 
on them. This perverse definition of validity would allow an end-run around the Clause and 
would defy the Framers’ intent to reassure debt-holders that their debts will be honored. 
110In the absence of the words “validity of the,” the Public Debt Clause might be viewed as 
establishing only a default rule. In other words, by pronouncing the legitimacy of “the public 
debt,” this version of the Clause would mandate the repayment of debts, including those 
incurred in suppressing rebellion, unless a future Congress specified otherwise. Such a clause 
would preclude judges from holding that Congress was unauthorized to accumulate a public 
debt, but would not prevent future Congresses from repudiating their obligations. 
111Thus a governmental delay in paying a debt violates the Clause. If the government refuses 
to make a payment on a debt at the time due but promises to make it later, the government 
has not maintained the validity of the debt. Rather, the government has effectively canceled 
the debt and substituted another one. While the government may well make good on its 
promise, but this compensation validates the later promise, not the original one. 
112A debt may become invalid regardless of whether Congress intended to make it so. The 
Clause’s focus on the validity of debts rather than on congressional action thus suggests that 
whether Congress intended for nonpayment to result is irrelevant. 
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d. Evolution of the Language 
 The evolution of the Clause suggests that Congress’s choice of 
language was not accidental. As discussed above,113 the final language of the 
Clause was close to the language of an earlier proposal, but it differed in that 
the phrase “validity . . . shall not be questioned” was substituted for “shall 
be inviolable.” The change suggests a conscious choice of “validity . . . shall 
not be questioned” over “inviolable,” which is close to “unrepudiable.”114 
Why would the Framers shift to the word “questioned” if the original 
language was what they actually meant? At the least, the shift suggests a 
preference for phraseology that protects the public debt so strongly as to put 
the government’s commitment to it beyond question. The only way to give 
effect to this preference is to interpret the Clause as precluding government 
action that makes default possible.  
3. Historical Evidence 
 Three historical factors suggest that the Framers viewed the Clause 
not just as a ban on nonpayment, but rather as a more general expression of 
the government’s commitment to ensuring the debt’s validity. First, as 
argued above,115 imminent debt repudiation was extremely unlikely given § 
3 of the Amendment, so there is no reason that the Framers would have been 
more concerned with the possibility that Congress would intentionally 
cancel debts than with the government’s general duty to secure payment of 
its debts. Indeed, the Clause reflected the Framers’ commitment to the 
sanctity of full faith and credit,116 and a purpose of the Clause was the 
securing of the nation’s credit by guaranteeing payment to bondholders.117 
Full investor confidence in the validity of the debt requires not just a 
constitutional nonpayment ban, but also a statutory regime that provides for 
payment.118 
                                                 
113See supra text accompanying note 31. 
114The difference between “inviolable” and “unrepudiable” is that the former makes clear 
that a partial invalidation of debt, such as a promise to pay back a bond but without interest, 
is impermissible. The phrase “the validity . . . shall not be questioned,” also appears to bar 
such violation, because a partial cancellation invalidates a debt obligation and replaces it 
with a lesser one. 
115See supra text accompanying notes 48-55. 
116See supra notes 43-47. 
117See supra note 34. 
118Even with constitutional protection, a statute providing for payment will boost investor 
confidence. See also infra note 181. Investors are more likely to perceive the Public Debt 
Clause as securing their debts if the Clause is applied to strike down statutes that would 
result in default. Even if debt-holders ultimately received payment, that payment would be 
delayed, the value of the debts would likely decline because of the initial repudiation, and the 
debt-holders would suffer litigation risk. In addition, if Congress were to engage in a course 
of action that would make it impossible (either practically or mathematically) for a successor 
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 Second, participants in the ratification debate did not conceptualize 
the Clause as being only a technical ban on the failure of the government to 
make debt payments. Both proponents and opponents of the Clause agreed 
that it precluded taxation of income from outstanding bonds.119 Such 
taxation would not trigger the intermediate level of generality, which bans 
only nonpayment, not actions occurring before or after scheduled payment 
that lower the value of debt.120 The debate suggests that the Clause was 
viewed as a general principle requiring the government to ensure the full 
and unconditional validity of debts.  
 Third, just a month before the final debate on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress passed a statute converting the bulk of bond 
payments into a permanent appropriation.121 Thus, instead of leaving 
bondholders to the whims of future Congresses or the courts, Congress 
sought to place the public debt above the fray.122 Accepting the intermediate 
level of generality would mean that Congress could repeal this statute and 
substitute an annual appropriation. It would be odd if a constitutional 
limitation and a statute pursued the same goal of protecting government 
debt, but the constitutional provision would tolerate repeal of the statute and 
thus subversion of the goal. 
4. Identifying Debt Questionings 
 While a repudiation rule offers the advantage of a simple 
enforcement test, it is also possible to create administrable tests for a 
prohibition on a broader class of debt questionings. A fact-finder could 
assess purported breaches of the Clause using either an objective or a 
subjective standard.123 The objective standard inquires into whether a 
                                                                                                                  
Congress to honor all of its debts, then the constitutional provision probably wouldn’t work. 
The Supreme Court might refuse to apply the Public Debt Clause, or it might be repealed 
through Article V amendment. 
119See, e.g., JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18, 224 
(1984). 
120The high level of generality probably does ban taxation of government bonds, at least at 
rates higher than those existing at the time of the bonds’ purchase. A tax jeopardizes debts by 
providing that they will not be honored in full unless Congress repeals the tax after payment. 
However, the Sixteenth Amendment’s allowance of income taxes arguably trumps the Public 
Debt Clause’s prohibition of excess bond taxation.  
121See supra note 54. Routine appropriations were made on an annual basis. See, e.g., Act of 
Apr. 6, 1866, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 14 (providing miscellaneous appropriations). 
122The statute may also reflect administrative simplicity, since Congress could know in 
advance when bonds would become due. However, in no meaningful sense is it more 
difficult for the government to budget expected payments during each budget cycle rather 
than in advance. What makes a permanent appropriation unique is that money will be spent 
unless Congress affirmatively repeals it. See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, “Budgetized” Health 
Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress’s 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 411, 415–16 (1996) (contrasting annual and permanent appropriations). 
123This section uses the terms “objective” and “subjective” to refer to whether a test 
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governmental action in fact jeopardized debt, while the subjective standard 
asks whether holders of the public debt are genuinely concerned about the 
validity of their debts. These standards can be translated into bright-line 
rules. For example, a bright-line test of the objective standard might be 
whether the United States would meet its debt obligations if Congress never 
passed another statute (or passed only statutes adhering to long-term budget 
projections).124 Similarly, with bond debt, a bright-line test of the subjective 
standard might be whether any rating service had downgraded the debt.125 
While it might seem odd for a constitutional test to depend on the actions of 
private agencies, this approach makes sense if the test’s aim is to dermine 
whether debtholders are genuinely considered about government action. Just 
because the objective and subjective standards may be translated into these 
bright-line tests does not necessarily mean that these are the only possible 
tests.126 The point is that it need not be difficult to apply a test once 
selected,127 even if it is difficult to pick a test from among those possible.128 
 It is impossible to prove that the bright-line objective and subjective 
tests sketched above are the best tests or that one is better than the other. 
However, there are practical reasons to prefer these tests over others, and to 
prefer the objective over the subjective. An advantage of both tests is that 
although they take the word “questioned” seriously, they do not turn the 
word into a hair-trigger. A wide range of governmental actions presumably 
has marginal effects on both the probability of default and concern about the 
                                                                                                                  
considers debtholders’ state of mind, not to whether a test may be administered without bias. 
124For example, if Congress repealed a statute providing for repayment of a debt not yet due, 
thus leaving it to the discretion of a future Congress whether to honor the debt, the repeal 
would violate the objective test. See also supra note 96. 
125Bright-line subjective tests for non-bond debt are more difficult, but not impossible, to 
develop. For example, a bright-line test of the solidity of government pensions might find a 
debt questioning if a given percentage of government employees began to purchase private 
insurance against the possibility of decreased payments. 
126For example, an alternative test for the objective standard, also bright-line, would consider 
a warning by a ratings service to constitute a debt questioning. The subjective standard could 
be assessed using a multi-factorial test, in which a judicial fact-finder might consider bond 
ratings, stock and bond prices, statistical studies, newspaper commentary, and testimony by 
debt-holders. Or a court might create a balancing test that allowed limited questionings 
where the government had substantial or compelling interests. 
127Even if the best test required a judge to make an intuitive finding about whether a debt 
questioning had occurred, such a judgment might still be superior to a rule narrowing debt 
questioning to repudiation. Judicial tests for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as 
the intermediate scrutiny Equal Protection Clause test for quasi-suspect classifications, are 
often difficult to apply but are applied nonetheless. See, e.g., Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 742-44 (Powell, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Court’s 
conclusion under intermediate-scrutiny test). 
128The difficulty in picking appropriate tests has, of course, not led the courts to assume that 
other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment should be applied as narrowly as possible. 
Rather, the judiciary actively debates what are appropriate tests for violation, for example, of 
the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., id. at 724 n.9 (O’Connor, J.) (confronting objections to 
intermediate-scrutiny test). 
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possibility of such default, but to conclude that all of these actions violate 
the Clause would stifle too much activity.129 Just because “questioned” is 
roughly synonymous with “jeopardized” does not provide a textual 
argument that any statute increasing the probability of repudiation even 
marginally should be held to constitute a debt questioning. Just because this 
Article has concluded that “to question” most closely means “to jeopardize” 
does not mean that it must conclude that “to question” means “to jeopardize 
even just a little bit.” “To question” might also mean “to jeopardize 
somewhat” or “to jeopardize a lot”. 
 Because nothing in the phrase “shall not be questioned” indicates to 
what degree jeopardization must occur before it will constitute a 
questioning, it makes sense for tests of questioning to take a balanced 
approach. On the one hand, a test should not brand as unconstitutional 
government actions that have very small effects on debt accumulation, but 
that Tests can recognize this by identifying only substantial increases in the 
probability of repudiation or in debt-holders’ concern about it. The objective 
test accordingly finds a questioning only when the existing statutory scheme 
would in fact lead to default in the absence of further congressional action. 
Similarly, the subjective test triggers the Clause only when a bond agency 
lowers the rating of U.S. debt because its riskiness passes a substantial 
threshold.130 
 The objective and subjective tests reflect different purposes of the 
Clause and the different plausible subjects of the past participle 
“questioned.” Essentially, the objective test identifies a questioning by the 
government and thus is compatible with an interpretation of the Clause as 
banning any congressional or judicial action making a debt’s repayment 
uncertain. The subjective test reflects the reassurance component of the 
Clause and asks whether the people have genuine concerns about the 
government’s actions. The objective standard may therefore be preferable, 
because the Clause achieves its goal of reassuring debt-holders through its 
central mechanism, a limit on governmental action.131 
                                                 
129For example, any increase in debt presumably raises the probability that the government 
will be unable to meet existing debts. But a rule preventing the government from issuing any 
new debts would clearly sweep too far and, indeed, defeat a purpose of the Public Debt 
Clause, the securitization of the nation’s debt issuance. 
130Relying on bond ratings rather than bond prices is essential. If the test targeted a decline 
in bond prices, it would inappropriately assume that investor jitters were a proxy for the 
probability of default. Bond prices reflect not only the probability of default but also changes 
in the time value of money and the availability of alternative investments. Bond ratings, 
however, reflect only those jitters caused by perceptions of an increased probability of 
default.  
131However, one could argue that either test alone or both tests together should identify a 
debt questioning for the Clause to be triggered. If the Public Debt Clause is seen as 
protecting against only those governmental actions threatening repudiation and worrying 
debt-holders, then both tests should be necessary conditions for triggering the Clause. In 
contrast, if the Clause is seen as protecting against only the possibility of repudiation or 
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C. Outer Reaches of the Clause’s Meaning 
 In sum, reading the Public Debt Clause literally leads to a 
construction of the Clause that is broad in two senses. First, the “public 
debt” includes statutorily authorized congressional budgetary promises 
besides financial bond instruments. Second, governmental actions short of 
direct repudiation may trigger the Clause if they endanger the validity of 
debts. This broad construction may not be the only plausible interpretation 
of the Clause; the Framers might have intended something much narrower 
but drafted the provision carelessly. The point is, however, that a broad 
judicial construction of the Clause would not be tantamount to implicit 
constitutional amendment in defiance of an obvious limited meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s words. Rather, such a broad construction would 
reflect a literal and sensible interpretation of the Clause’s words. 
 This Article’s interpretation of the Public Debt Clause hardly 
exhausts questions about the Clause’s substantive limits.132 For example, 
does the Clause encompass debts that the government incurs through 
compulsion, or only those in which the government’s promise serves as an 
incentive in the open market for assumption of government debts?133 May 
Congress make a promise that would ordinarily become part of the public 
debt, but reserve to itself the right to change or renege on its promise?134 
Does the Public Debt Clause encompass all debts, or only those that the 
Congress explicitly makes on the credit of the United States or pursuant to 
the Clause itself?135  
                                                                                                                  
against only concern about repudiation, then the single appropriate test should be sufficient. 
132Equally difficult are questions about the Clause’s procedural limits; what happens when 
Congress appears to violate the Public Debt Clause? Some of these questions are addressed 
in Part IV, infra, which asks to what extent constitutional infirmities in budget processes and 
policies are justiciable. 
133For example, one might argue that if the government were to require all Americans to buy 
$500 bonds, those bonds would not implicate the Public Debt Clause. Because the 
government could have simply compelled purchase without exchanging a promise, it has not 
taken advantage of the credibility that the Public Debt Clause provides. This argument, 
however, may at odds with a central purpose of the Clause: assuring the public that 
greenbacks, which the Legal Tender Acts forced on government contractors, would remain 
valid. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46. On the other hand, government contractors 
retained the option of leaving the market altogether. 
134Suppose, for example, that the Congress issued bonds with a maturity value of $500, but 
provided in the bonds’ terms that Congress shall pay on maturity $500, or such other amount 
as it might subsequently decree by law. Although the bondholder recognizes ex ante that the 
bond’s value is subject to Congressional discretion, one might argue that the Public Debt 
Clause precludes the government from issuing non-full faith debt or, more generally, 
reserving to itself the right to renege on its promises. On the other hand, if one accepts the 
principle that the government may reserve to itself the unilateral right to modify promises, 
one might further argue that such a reservation is inherent in the legislative power itself. 
135A rule that Congress incurs a debt only by specific reference to the Clause would be 
tantamount to a default rule treating Congressional promises as retractable. Such a default 
rule might be a sensible bright-line rule if recipients of governmental promises ordinarily 
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 These questions are difficult both interpretively and normatively. 
Nothing in the history or language of the Clause indicates to what extent 
Congress may control whether a given transaction implicates the Clause. 
Allowing Congress to withhold full-faith status from obligations seems 
counter to the nature of a constitutional provision limiting congressional 
power and discretion. On the other hand, robotically tossing all 
congressional promises into the public debt leaves open the possibility that 
Congress might use the Public Debt Clause as a constitutional trick to 
impose its substantive budgetary preferences on future Congresses. There 
are sensible middle-ground positions; for example, the Clause might be 
interpreted as binding whenever Congress makes an unqualified promise 
and could reasonably have believed that binding itself would be beneficial. 
This Article assumes that the courts could place appropriate limits on the 
Public Debt Clause,136 and Part II attempts to distinguish situations in which 
the Clause’s applicability depends on the broad construction that this 
Section defends or on particular additional assumptions about the Clause’s 
limits. 
III. Applications of the Public Debt Clause 
 This Part describes how application of the Public Debt Clause could 
reform congressional budget process problems that threaten fiscal disaster 
along various time horizons. Section III.A shows how the Clause could limit 
the destructive potential of budget impasses in the short term. Turning to 
long-term problems, Section III.B explains how the Clause could diminish 
accumulation of debts, while Section III.C assesses whether the Clause 
protects the entitlements that contribute to the debt. This organization also 
tracks movement from budgetary issues that the Clause almost certainly 
affects to areas in which the Clause’s relevance is less certain. 
A. Train Wrecks 
 Congressional budget impasses introduce the specter of “train 
wrecks.”137 The metaphor goes like this: When Congress and the President 
fail to agree on a budget by the beginning of the fiscal year, the previously 
                                                                                                                  
realize that the government is likely to renege. The counterargument, of course, would be 
that the point of the Public Debt Clause is to instill confidence in the reliability of 
government promises. 
136Any jurisprudential rules limiting the Clause’s applicability would need to clarify first, 
how unequivocally Congress must act in making a promise for it to become part of the public 
debt, and second, what showing Congress must make to establish that the promise reflects a 
genuine debt rather than a substantive value preference. The broadest possible interpretation 
of the Clause would place any congressional promise into the debt without examining 
Congress’s motives. 
137See Michael Wines, The Budget: A Train Wreck?, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, at 22. 
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smooth-running government train begins to derail, with non-essential 
services138 pushed along only if Congress and the President can agree on 
“continuing resolutions.”139 The train continues to edge forward until the 
government both runs out of cash and reaches the federal limit on 
borrowing. Then, the government train crashes and stops, a wreck that only 
a subsequent infusion of cash or a suspension of the debt limit can budge. 
 No budget impasse has ever led to a train wreck, but it has come 
close, most recently and precariously at the start of the 1996 fiscal year,140 
when the inability of Congress and the President to agree on a budget or a 
debt-limit increase threatened default.141 The government shut down non-
essential services, but temporary waivers of the federal debt limit142 and 
accounting tricks by the Treasury143 kept the government from reaching the 
limit.144 Although the Congressional Budget Office has recommended 
abolition of the federal debt limit,145 Congress has not responded. The 
                                                 
138Non-essential services are those not “involving the safety of human life or the protection 
of property.” 13 U.S.C. § 1342 (1996). 
139See, e.g., Act of Nov. 20, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-56, 109 Stat. 548 (allowing temporary 
funding of some federal government programs). 
140An earlier debt-ceiling crisis occurred in 1985. See, e.g., Alan Murray, Treasury Says U.S. 
Will Default Friday Without Debt Bill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1985, at A1. 
141See, e.g., Leon Hadar, US Default on Debt? Oh Yes, It Can Happen, BUSINESS TIMES, Jan. 
19, 1996, at 10; Alan Murray, Debt-Limit Crisis Is Not Over Yet, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1995, 
at A1. 
142See, e.g., Act of Feb. 8, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-103, 110 Stat. 55 (exempting amount 
equivalent to one month of Social Security payments from being counted toward debt 
ceiling); Act of March 12, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-115, 110 Stat. 825.(exempting government 
trust fund investments and reinvestments from debt ceiling). 
143Treasury Secretary Rubin took advantage of statutory changes passed in the wake of the 
1985 debt-ceiling crisis designed to help avert default. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, Title VI, sec. 6002(a)-(c), 100 Stat. 1874, 1931. The 
changes authorized him to redirect investments in pensions funds, 5 U.S.C. § 8348(j)(1) 
(1996), and “to sell or redeem securities, obligations, or other invested assets of the Fund 
before maturity in order to prevent the public debt of the United States from exceeding the 
public debt limit,” § 8348(k)(1). The Secretary may take these actions only during a “debt 
issuance suspension period,” defined in § 8348(j)(5)(B) as “any period for which the 
Secretary of the Treasury determines . . . that the issuance of obligations of the United States 
may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit.” The General Accounting Office 
later determined that the Treasury’s actions were authorized by the statute. See GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEBT CEILING--ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 1995-1996 CRISIS 
(1996); Clay Chandler, GAO Says Rubin Tapped Retirement Funds Legally, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 7, 1996, at D2. Republicans have charged, however, that Secretary Rubin exceeded his 
legal authority. See NICK SMITH, REPORT OF THE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON THE DEBT LIMIT AND 
MISUSE OF THE TRUST FUNDS (1996) (questioning Secretary’s authority to declare debt 
issuance suspension period); Constitutional Debt Crisis, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 
1996, at 15C (noting statements of former Attorneys General and Treasury Secretaries 
warning of illegality of Treasury Secretary Rubin’s plans). 
144See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, sec. 301, 110 
Stat. 847 (resolving crisis by raising debt ceiling). 
145See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 
48, 54 (1995). The General Accounting Office has long favored elimination of the statutory 
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possibility of a future train wreck thus raises two questions: First, is it 
constitutional under the Public Debt Clause for the government to stop 
payments on bonds and other obligations? And second, is the debt-limit 
statute that makes a train wreck possible itself constitutional? 
1. Governmental Failure to Make Payments on Bonds 
 If the debt were to reach the statutory ceiling,146 the Treasury might 
fail to make a required interest payments on its bonds.147 Such a failure 
would transcend mere questioning of the public debt’s validity; it would 
constitute partial invalidation of the public debt, because the Treasury 
commits in its regulations to make interest payments at certain times.148 
Such partial invalidation runs afoul of the Public Debt Clause for two 
reasons.149 First, a “partial-faith-and-credit” principle would allow the 
government to liquidate its debts for nominal consideration and convert the 
Clause into a virtual nullity. Second, a delay in payment calls into question 
the government’s commitment to pay the remainder of a debt and its 
commitment to pay other debts, thus violating the proviso that the debt’s 
validity “not be questioned.”150 
 Assuming that the government must pay damages for a breach of 
the Public Debt Clause, what is the measure of damages?151 Because bond 
                                                                                                                  
debt limit. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A NEW APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC DEBT 
LEGISLATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED (1979). Bills accomplishing a repeal were considered 
in the last Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 215, 104th Cong. (1995). 
146The debt limit is set in 31 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (Westlaw 1996), which currently provides that 
“[t]he face amount of obligations . . . whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the 
United States Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of the 
Treasury) may not be more than $5,500,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time . . . .” For a 
comprehensive history of § 3101, see DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996, HISTORICAL TABLES 92-94 (1995) 
[hereinafter HISTORICAL TABLES]. 
147The United States has failed to make timely payments before, most recently in 1979, when 
despite the resolution of a debt-limit crisis, administrative snafus at the Treasury Department 
led to delayed payments on some bond issues. See James J. Angel, Looking Back at Debt 
Defaults in U.S. History, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1996, at 21 (arguing that default “would have 
serious consequences, but . . . would not be the end of the world”). 
148See 31 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(5) (1996) (authorizing Treasury to specify dates on which it will 
pay bonds’ principal and interest). 
149At least two newspaper editorials have suggested that default on the debt would be 
unconstitutional. See Steve Charnovitz, Extortion and the Debt Ceiling, J. COMMERCE, Nov. 
16, 1995, at 10A; George B. Tindall, Is This Train Wreck Constitutional?, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (RALEIGH), Nov. 15, 1995, at A25. 
150Even the possibility of a partial repudiation caused investors to lose some faith in U.S. 
bonds. See David E. Sanger, S.&P. Strongly Warns U.S. on the Danger of Default, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at 37 (reporting that faith of investors in government debt had been 
diminished, despite Standard & Poor’s decision not to lower United States’s AAA credit 
rating). 
151Just because the United States would presumably need to pay damages for failing to honor 
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markets are highly competitive, a bondholder presumably could have 
purchased a perfect substitute for a U.S. bond, so the bondholder’s damages 
are the same using either an expectancy or a reliance formulation.152 Under 
either scheme, the government would owe not just the missed interest 
payment, but also interest on that payment that would have accumulated 
during litigation. Even these damages might not fully compensate 
bondholders, however, since the debt repudiation would hurt the United 
States’s credit rating and thus lower the value of outstanding bonds.153 
2. Non-Bond Obligations Within the Public Debt 
 The government’s reaching the debt ceiling would stop not just 
interest payments on bonds, but also other government obligations. Unless 
the Public Debt Clause applies only to debts explicitly made on the credit of 
the United States, ceasing payments for some of these obligations would 
also raise constitutional questions. Indeed, such a cessation would be 
problematic not only if it occurred because of a debt-ceiling crash, but also 
if Congress and the President failed to reach a budget agreement and the 
government shut down, as in 1995-96. 
 Determining which government payments are discretionary and 
which are required under the Public Debt Clause may be difficult in some 
instances, but some ordinary government expenditures fit squarely within 
the broad construction of the public debt defended in Part II. For example, 
                                                                                                                  
a debt does not mean that it is constitutional for the United States not to honor a debt, as long 
as it pays later. In other words, there is no reason to import into the Public Debt Clause the 
limited, Holmesian view of contractual obligation: “The only universal consequence of a 
legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised 
event does not come to pass.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881). 
The Public Debt Clause changes the promisor’s ordinary choice by requiring the United 
States to meet its fiscal commitments. For the Clause to have any enforceability, the courts 
will need to be able to impose damages if the United States fails in its constitutional duty, but 
this does not mean that the government has taken a constitutionally permissible step by 
failing to make a debt payment. Nonetheless, there is something anomalous about enforcing a 
constitutional requirement that the government keep promises by allowing the government to 
break promises and then pay damages. The cure in the case of the budget impasses is for the 
courts to strike down the debt-limit statute that makes default possible, as explained below. 
152See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: 
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 225 n.20 (1987) (noting 
conditions for merger of expectancy and reliance damages). 
153Computing such damages would be difficult, because a court decision reimbursing a 
bondholder would reinstill confidence in U.S. bonds and cause them to appreciate. It is 
possible that the bonds would rise to even greater than their initial value, since such a 
decision could reassure bondholders about the vitality of the Public Debt Clause and make 
uncompensated repudiation seem even less likely than initially. On the other hand, 
bondholders might not have confidence in the precedential value of the court decision, and 
the willingness of the government to default might overshadow the willingness of the court to 
order compensation. In addition, any uncompensated litigation costs incurred in defending 
bonds adds to the cost of their ownership. 
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government civil-service pension payments and money owed to independent 
contractors represent unambiguous obligations that the government owes 
because of past agreements in which the debt-holders have already fulfilled 
their part of the bargains. 
 There are gray areas in which recipients of government money have 
an expectation of continued receipt but in which there may or may not be an 
agreement triggering the Public Debt Clause. If the Public Debt Clause 
applies to obligations that the government requires individuals to purchase, a 
budget crisis might not relieve the government of its duty to issue Social 
Security checks, since it has promised to make payments from a trust fund 
accumulated in part through recipients’ own contributions.154 A failure by 
the government to make a payment because of a train wreck would breach a 
statutorily established agreement that the government will provide 
beneficiaries means of subsistence in exchange for their earlier 
contributions.155 Medicare is less likely to qualify as a government 
agreement with beneficiaries, because there is less of a nexus between an 
individual’s contributions and benefits than in the case of Social Security.156 
 Similarly, current government employees expect to be paid, but they 
are subject to dismissal,157 and the annual budget process serves as an 
implicit annual review of which employees’ contracts to renew. Whether the 
government would need to make salary payments depends on whether the 
government incurs a public debt when it hires an employee or when the 
employee has actually performed contracted-for duties. This hinges in turn 
on whether the government is considered to have formed agreements of 
continued employment with its employees. 
3. The Federal Debt-Limit Statute 
 Regardless of which governmental obligations are part of the public 
debt and thus unconstitutional to repudiate, the federal debt-limit statute 
makes train wrecks and thus repudiation possible. Although the debt-limit 
statute is theoretically written in pursuance of the goals of the Public Debt 
                                                 
154See Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 622 (principally codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1996)). 
155The counterargument is that the government has not entered into agreements with 
beneficiaries, but rather has established a statutory scheme that it can change. See infra 
Section III.C. Even if the government has reserved the right to alter Social Security in 
general, however, a beneficiary might claim that the government must continue to make 
payments until it changes the statutory scheme to discontinue them. 
156Medicare is a hybrid system. Part A of Medicare, providing hospital insurance, is funded 
like Social Security, through a special payroll tax that accumulates in a trust fund. Part B, 
offering supplemental medical insurance, is funded primarily through general tax revenues. 
See, e.g., Tiefer, supra note 122, at 417. 
157Cf. Crenshew v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890) (holding that government employee 
has no contractual right against termination by Congress on public-policy grounds). 
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Clause,158 it works counter to the Clause’s goals. The statute precludes 
government borrowing above a level that Congress has set, even if that 
borrowing is needed to meet expenses required to maintain the public debt’s 
validity. The statute thus works at cross-purposes, serving both as a 
legitimate exercise of federal power under the Public Debt Clause159 and as 
a potential cause of unconstitutional debt repudiation. Whether the statute in 
fact increases or decreases the probability of default or investor confidence 
is therefore impossible to determine a priori.160 Under the objective and 
subjective tests for debt repudiation defended above,161 however, it is not 
necessary to weigh these effects speculatively,162 and the statute flunks at 
least the objective test and possibly the subjective test also. 
 The Public Debt Clause promises bondholders not just that bonds 
will remain valid, but that their validity will not be questioned.163 The debt 
limit will necessarily lead to the repudiation of governmental obligations in 
the absence of congressional action, as the statutory scheme leaves open to 
question whether a later Congress will honor the public debt by changing 
the laws. The debt ceiling thus fails the objective test for debt questioning. 
Even if the Clause allowed one Congress to count on a future Congress to 
pay required debts, the debt limit statute is still suspect, because in the 
absence of the statute, repayment would necessarily occur.164 The debt limit 
thus takes an affirmative step toward repudiation and places into question 
Congress’s commitment elsewhere expressed to pay the debt. 
 In addition, the statute functionally has allowed Congress to play 
chicken in Washington fiscal negotiations;165 Congress runs the budget train 
                                                 
158Indeed, the drafters of the proposed Balanced Budget Amendment effectively sought to 
constitutionalize the debt-limit statute by requiring a three-fifths majority of both Houses to 
raise the debt limit. See S.J. Res. 1, § 2 (1995). But see Seto, supra note 10, at 1516–19 
(criticizing this enforcement mechanism). 
159Combining Sections 4 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to 
legislate to ensure the validity of the public debt. See also infra Subsection III.B.2. 
160The empirical question is whether the statute, by reflecting a congressional commitment 
not to let the debt rise above a certain level, inspires confidence in U.S. bonds that makes up 
for the chance of repudiation in the event of a train wreck. Because the debt limit has so far 
failed to stem long-term debt growth but has come close to bringing a train wreck, it seems 
intuitively likely that the statute decreases confidence.  
161See supra Subsection II.B.4. 
162That the tests do not require such a weighing makes sense in this context for two reasons. 
First, the tests are bright-line rules and thus designed not to entail abstract balancing. Second, 
Congress could exempt payments on the debt from the statute and thus preserve its debt-
ensuring effects. 
163See supra Section II.B. Under this Article’s interpretation of “validity . . . shall not be 
questioned,” the debt-limit statute may be attacked on its face and not merely only when it 
leads to repudiation of a debt in a particular circumstance.  
164Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (pledging faith of United States in paying its bond obligations). 
165See, e.g., Adam Clymer, G.O.P. Lawmakers Offer to Abandon Debt-Limit Threat, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A1 (describing Republicans’ offer to raise debt limit in exchange for 
“down payment” on balanced budget). 
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directly toward the debt limit, hoping to force the President to make the turn 
that Congress prefers.166 If this abuse of the public-debt statute causes 
bondholders to question the validity of their debts, the Clause might be 
breached under a subjective test of its meaning,167 even if no default occurs. 
In addition, this abuse of the debt-limit statute militates against a conclusion 
that Congress’s intent in the statue is genuinely to protect the validity of the 
debt. 
 As long as tax receipts are greater than public debt payments, a 
prioritization of public debt payments over other expenses could harmonize 
a debt-limit statute with the Public Debt Clause. The statutory scheme does 
not currently allow for such preferential treatment; the Treasury pays 
obligations on a rolling basis.168 When the public-debt ceiling has been 
reached, the Treasury makes a payment only if it has sufficient 
governmental receipts to do so. Government receipts arrive sporadically 
throughout the tax year,169 and a lump sum of receipts might be depleted by 
non-public debt expenses just before a debt payment becomes due. 
Therefore even with a budget in balance or surplus, the government might 
temporarily hit the debt ceiling in the middle of the year and fail to make 
needed expenses. It is theoretically possible that the timing of receipts and 
expenses would work out such that this would not occur, but nothing in 
federal budget practice guarantees this. 
 A debt-limit statute aimed only at ensuring the validity of the public 
debt would exempt borrowing for payments on the debt. In the absence of 
such amendment, it is difficult to imagine a modification, either judicially or 
congressionally imposed, that could save the debt-limit statute’s 
constitutionality. A statute might allow the Treasury Secretary to anticipate 
the possibility of a debt-ceiling crisis and stop non-debt expenses to save for 
impending debt payments. The Treasury Secretary, however, might fail to 
anticipate a debt-ceiling crisis170 or might underestimate its duration. Thus, 
                                                 
166In theory, the game might flip, with the executive branch refusing to approve an increase 
in the public debt limit unless the legislative branch caves in to budget demands. Congress, 
however, has rigged the game by providing in 31 U.S.C. § 3101 that the House can 
unilaterally raise the debt ceiling as necessary under its House Rule XLIX, also known as the 
Gephardt Rule. This rigging further undermines the claim that the debt ceiling’s goal is to 
preserve the validity of the debt. 
167See supra text accompanying note 125. Under the subjective test proposed, the Clause 
would not have been breached since the debt was not downgraded. However, under a 
different formulation of the test, for example considering any investor skittishness sufficient 
to trigger the Clause, the Clause might have been violated. 
168Under 31 U.S.C. § 3102 (1996), the Treasury Secretary may issue bonds to cover 
expenses as they become due. 
169In December, 1995, for example, a sudden infusion of quarterly estimated tax payments 
helped keep the government briefly afloat. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 
143, at 24-25. 
170Indeed, existing law already gives the Secretary authority to declare a debt issuance 
suspension period and take certain defensive actions. See supra note 143. But like politics 
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unless the Secretary ultimately has the authority to borrow to make 
payments on the public debt, the debt-limit statute leaves open the 
possibility of default and violates the Public Debt Clause. 
B. Deficits and Debt 
 To read the Public Debt Clause as requiring a balanced budget 
would be a remarkable feat of interpretive legerdemain. After all, the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had just accumulated massive 
deficits and certainly were not promising never to do so again. Additionally, 
economists agree that a budget deficit of zero is a convenient but arbitrary 
target,171 so it can hardly be read into the Public Debt Clause’s text. 
However, just because the Clause is not a Balanced Budget Amendment in 
disguise does not mean that it cannot serve as a substitute for such an 
amendment. If the accumulation of deficits makes questionable the 
government’s ability to meet existing debt obligations, then the Clause may 
be triggered. 
1. Unsustainable Debt Accumulation 
 The U.S. debt today is relatively small,172 and American bonds are 
considered among the “world’s safest investments.”173 Economists warn, 
however, that if the United States fails to increase taxes or reduce spending, 
the debt will spiral to unprecedented levels.174 Indeed, without change, the 
debt would increase faster than the growth of the economy itself. 
Economists define such growth as unsustainable,175 since if it remained 
unchecked, payments on the debt would ultimately consume the nation’s 
entire economic output. Of course, at some point Stein’s Law will become 
                                                                                                                  
generally, debt-ceiling crises can be unpredictable. 
171See, e.g., WILLIAM R. KEECH, ECONOMIC POLITICS 123 (1995) (“A nominal balance of the 
government’s revenues and expenditures is a thoroughly arbitrary target, although it is very 
appealing politically because it is simpler than any other target and thus is more widely 
understood among voters.”). 
172The debt held by the public at the end of fiscal year 1996 is projected at 52.1% of GDP; in 
other words, the debt is only about half one-year’s national income. See HISTORICAL TABLES, 
supra note 146, at 90. The United States’s structural budget deficit is smaller than that of all 
but two other OECD industrialized countries. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra 
note 5, at 90. For a review of the causes of large debts in OECD countries, see ALBERTO 
ALESINA & ROBERTO PEROTTI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUDGET DEFICITS (International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/94/85, Aug. 1994). 
173See, e.g., Financial Markets, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at D3 (noting that U.S. bonds 
retain highest possible ratings). 
174The Congressional Budget Office projects that under current policies, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio will climb to 311% by 2050. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 5, at 77.  
175See id. at xxiii (“For a path of spending and revenues to be sustainable, the resulting debt 
must eventually grow no faster than the economy.”). 
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operative: “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”176 The question 
is whether it will stop before a crisis of confidence in U.S. debt, after such a 
crisis but before repudiation, or after national insolvency.177 Most of the 
United States’s debt is internally held,178 so a political constituency would 
oppose any effort at debt repudiation. If this Article is correct, such an effort 
would require a constitutional amendment,179 so even a minority might 
thwart it. But some have credited massive debt levels with bringing about 
the French and Russian Revolutions,180 and a true debt crisis could force the 
government to cut social services and bring unpredictable unrest. 
 The Public Debt Clause’s “shall not be questioned” language allows 
the courts to intervene before debt repudiation becomes a viable option.181 
The quandary, however, is in the line-drawing. Whenever the United States 
runs a deficit, it moves closer to an unmanageable debt level, but applying a 
hair-trigger test to debt accumulation would inflate the Public Debt Clause 
into a full-scale Balanced Budget Amendment. But if this approach would 
apply the Clause too soon, then waiting for debt repudiation applies it too 
late. 
 Both the objective and subjective tests of debt questioning182 
provide ways to apply the Clause in between these extremes. The subjective 
standard would be triggered when debt accumulation becomes so excessive 
that bond rating agencies downgrade U.S. debt. The objective standard 
would preclude any budget that would cause the debt to cross the economic 
                                                 
176See, e.g., Herbert Stein, Leave the Trade Deficit Alone, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1987, at 
A20. 
177In a technical sense, governments cannot go bankrupt, since bankruptcy proceedings do 
not apply to the federal government. Moreover, the government can always whittle the debt 
down through inflation, except to the extent the debt is held in inflation-indexed bonds. See 
John R. Wilke, Treasury Plans to Sell Inflation-Indexed Bonds, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1996, 
at C1 (noting first planned Treasury issue of bonds protected against inflation).  
178Approximately 20 percent of the national debt is held by foreigners. See ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 82, at 195-96. 
179One could argue that the Public Debt Clause is unrepealable. If repeal were proposed in a 
national crisis, the debt would unconstitutionally be in question after repeal seemed viable 
but before ratification by the states. However, Article V’s strong presumption of 
amendability probably means the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to 
make an exception to Article V. 
180See Seto, supra note 10, at 1459 & nn.24–25. 
181This suggests a paradox: If the Supreme Court held debt accumulation to constitute a 
questioning, then presumably it would also hold repudiation illegal, but that precedent would 
mean that debt accumulation could not constitutionally lead to repudiation, and thus the 
accumulation ought not constitute a questioning. A resolution to this paradox views the 
government’s actions independent of the Public Debt Clause’s constitutional restraint. This is 
the only way to honor the Clause’s “shall not be questioned” language. Moreover, Article V 
permits repeal of constitutional provisions, so fiscal unsustainability puts into question the 
validity of the public debt by making repeal seem like a viable option. Even without Article 
V, the Supreme Court might in a national crisis overrule precedent and allow debt 
repudiation.  
182See supra Subsection II.B.4. 
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threshold of unsustainability.183 A deficit hawk might seek earlier 
application of the objective test by noting that the statutory scheme places 
the economy on the way to unsustainability. Such an anticipatory thrust is 
two levels removed from actual default, but there is no compelling 
counterargument to this expansive interpretation of “shall not be 
questioned.”184 In addition, it makes normative sense to deal with problems 
sooner rather than later,185 and it therefore might be healthy for the courts to 
ask Congress to clarify its long-term goals. 
2. Legislation Forcing Deficit Reduction 
 Although Congress just missed the supermajority needed to pass the 
Balanced Budget Amendment,186 congressional support for a scheme that 
would tie Congress’s hands and force budget balance has long been strong. 
Indeed, with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985,187 popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Congress attempted 
to create a statutory regime that would force budget balance by requiring the 
Comptroller General to implement an across-the-board cut, known as a 
sequestration, of non-entitlement expenditures to achieve balance if 
Congress failed to reach balance on its own.188 Although the Supreme Court 
found the Comptroller General’s role in this scheme unconstitutional in 
Bowsher v. Synar,189 Congress cured the statute’s constitutional 
infirmities.190 Deficits continued to climb, however, as Congress and the 
Office of Management and Budget took advantage of accounting 
                                                 
183Application of such a standard would require a determination of whether interest 
payments on the debt are increasing at a faster rate than the economy will grow. Predictions 
of economic growth are uncertain, but given governmental economic statistics, this standard 
should be easy to apply. The statistics might in fact be inaccurate, but by mapping an 
isomorphism from the unquestionable validity of the public debt to its sustainability, the 
standard allows for dispassionate, bright-line assessment.  
184Whether a budget on the path to unsustainability fails the objective test depends on 
whether the test asks what would happen if Congress passes no further statutes or what 
would happen if Congress sticks to its long-term plans. 
185See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND 
REVENUE OPTIONS 450 (1996) (arguing for addressing spending growth before retirement of 
baby boomers). 
186See supra note 10. 
187Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42 
U.S.C.).  
188See generally Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593 (1988). 
189478 U.S. 714 (1986). The Court held that because Congress reserved the right to remove 
the Comptroller General, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings violated separations-of-powers 
principles by giving Congress a role in the execution of the laws. Id. at 736. 
190See The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-119, tit. I-II, 101 Stat. 754 (1987). 
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loopholes,191 and ultimately Congress gave up on the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings approach altogether, replacing it with the Budget Enforcement Act 
of 1990,192 which relied mostly on voluntary congressional compliance with 
deficit targets. In the end, Congress was unable to resist the lure of deficit 
spending. 
 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings failed because of the general rule that 
later legislative enactments are given priority over earlier ones.193 But later 
statutes may not unconstitutionally repeal earlier ones, and the Public Debt 
Clause may make it unconstitutional for Congress to deviate from a course 
adopted pursuant to the Public Debt Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.194 If Congress explicitly creates a scheme to secure the validity 
of the public debt, and a subsequent Congress overturns that scheme, such a 
reversal might constitute a “questioning” of the validity of the debt.  
 This argument would be strongest for a statute explicitly invoking 
Sections 4 and 5 and providing that it may be amended only if the 
modification would not constitute a debt questioning.195 A court scrutinizing 
an amendment to or a repeal of such legislation would then apply an 
incarnation of either the subjective or the objective test of debt 
questioning.196 As usual, the subjective test would consider whether the 
change undercut the bond markets’ faith in government debt. The alternative 
objective test would assess whether the change would cause unsustainable 
debt growth or, using a broader version of the test, would put the 
government on the path to such unconstitutional growth.  
                                                 
191For a description of these loopholes, as well as of the failure of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
and the adoption of the Budget Enforcement Act, see Joyce & Reischauer, supra note 9, at 
433-40. 
192Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-
922 (1996)). 
193See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Corning, 179 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding that later budgets 
override inconsistencies with earlier ones). 
194Section 5 provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article.” 
195Even a court that would not have found the abandonment of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
unconstitutional might be wary if Congress had earlier limited a debt-reduction statute’s 
amendability. Congress’s power under § 5 to enforce the values of the Public Debt Clause 
probably extends beyond the courts’ power to enforce the Clause’s letter.  Although 
Congress has never taken explicit advantage of § 5 in the context of the Public Debt Clause, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted § 5 broadly in the context of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court applied a rational-basis test to 
determine whether congressional action reflected the Fourteenth Amendment’s goals. The 
Court thus upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965’s nullification of an English literacy 
requirement even though such a requirement was not itself unconstitutional. Similarly, even 
if abandonment of a debt-reduction scheme would not ordinarily be unconstitutional, the 
Court might uphold legislation defining such abandonment as a debt questioning since the 
legislation is rationally related to upholding the goals of the Public Debt Clause. 
196See supra Subsection II.B.4. 
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 There are two supplemental reasons for viewing the Clause as 
allowing Congress to tie its own hands with a Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
plan. First, the Public Debt Clause is inherently intertemporal, providing that 
Congress may not renege on an earlier Congress’s budgetary commitments. 
If Congress were to frame a Gramm-Rudman-Hollings scheme as a promise 
to future purchasers of government securities that it will adhere to a specific 
budgetary path, or if it incorporated such a promise directly in the bond 
contract, then deviating from that path might be considered a default on that 
promise. Second, the only type of legislation that could ensure the validity 
of the public debt against the will of future Congresses is legislation that ties 
Congress’s hands, so unless § 5 was not meant to apply to § 4, not enforcing 
hand-tying legislation thwarts the Framers’ intent in § 5.197 The problem 
with this analysis is that it seems too broad, since it would afford all debt 
legislation quasi-constitutional status.198 But this problem vanishes if § 4 
and § 5 are read together as allowing Congress to preclude its successors 
from amending a debt-reduction statute in a way that would constitute a debt 
questioning. 
C. Entitlements 
 Part I’s broad construction of what constitutes the “public debt” 
gives encouragement to those who oppose cuts in Social Security and other 
entitlement spending. After all, Social Security is a social contract providing 
for insurance payments to be made in exchange for beneficiaries’ earlier 
contributions.199 In essence, with Social Security and Medicare, the United 
States has accumulated an “implicit pension debt”200 that the Constitution 
protects. 
 Or so the argument goes. But there are reasons--textual, 
jurisprudential, and practical--that protecting entitlements with the Public 
Debt Clause begins to stretch the Clause’s meaning. First, the social contract 
that Social Security embodies might not trigger the Clause, because the 
government has not entered into written agreements with beneficiaries. 
Second, Part I of this Article left open the question of whether the Clause is 
                                                 
197Professor Seto similarly notes in the context of the Balanced Budget Amendment that a 
provision giving Congress enforcement power might allow Congress to override the ordinary 
rule that subsequent laws supersede prior laws. See Seto, supra note 10, at 1527. 
198Indeed, such a reading might suggest that Congress may not repeal, or even amend, the 
debt-limit statute. This would bludgeon Congress into crafting balanced budgets and could 
lead to unconstitutional debt defaults if Congress failed. 
199See, e.g., William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 461 (1996) (describing entitlement programs and urging continued funding).  
200See Cheikh Kane & Robert Palacios, The Implicit Pension Debt, FIN. & DEV., June 1996, 
at 36 (describing magnitude of unfunded pension obligations in both industrialized and 
developing countries). The authors note that many countries’ debt promises are 
constitutionally protected. Id. at 36. 
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implicated when citizens are required to acquire government obligations. 
Regardless of label, Social Security insurance contributions are a tax. Like 
the last argument, this one draws a wall, perhaps artificial, between 
agreements embodied in statutes and those on paper. 
 Third, the Supreme Court has held, though without considering the 
Public Debt Clause, that Congress does have the right to cancel Social 
Security payments. In Flemming v. Nestor,201 the Court ruled constitutional 
a statute retroactively withdrawing Social Security benefits from aliens 
deported for Communist Party affiliations. The Court noted that Congress 
had reserved to itself “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of 
the Social Security Act,202 and found the beneficiary’s absence from the 
United States a sufficient rationale for the statute to pass muster under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.203 
 The fourth, practical reason to be wary of arguments that the Public 
Debt Clause protects entitlements is that such arguments transform the 
Clause from a brake against fiscal chaos to an accelerator that could push 
the economy off the fiscal cliff.204 If the government must meet its 
entitlements promises, then it will need to pay for these promises with high 
tax rates and drastic reduction in other government services.205 However, if 
Congress waits too long to respond to the impending entitlements crisis, 
anything might happen in the “generational warfare” that some say would 
result.206 The Supreme Court could overrule Flemming because it failed to 
consider the Public Debt Clause,207 or seize on the Flemming Court’s 
                                                 
201363 U.S. 603 (1960). 
202This reservation remains in force. See 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1996). 
203363 U.S. at 611-12. 
204This practical concern may help to explain the Supreme Court’s disposition in Perry v. 
United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Once the 
government has accumulated debts that it cannot afford to pay, it may make ex post financial 
sense to relieve the government of its obligations. Because the Public Debt Clause achieves 
its purposes by tying Congress’s hands ex ante, such a rationale is constitutionally 
insufficient. But it is understandable that the courts might subvert the Framers’ intent, 
especially given the uncertainty of the government’s duty not to renege on entitlement 
obligations, if enforcing those obligations would be economically disastrous. 
205Of course, if it became clear in the near future that Congress will not be able to renege on 
its entitlement obligations, Congress might prospectively reform the system by replacing the 
pay-as-you-go approach with a fully funded, actuarially sound alternative. See James Tobin, 
The Future of Social Security: One Economist’s Perspective, in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND 
THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 41 (Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988) 
(suggesting system linking contributions and benefits). Or, Congress might, as Charles Tiefer 
predicts, budgetize entitlements entirely by subjecting them to the rigors of the 
appropriations process. See Tiefer, supra note 122, at 459. 
206See, e.g., John A Cutter, Tsongas Warns Against ‘Generational Warfare’, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at 7A. 
207The Court also could overrule Flemming as incorrectly construing the Due Process 
Clause. Charles Reich bitterly critiqued Flemming in his ultimately vindicated analysis of 
“new property.” See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 768-71 (1964). 
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comment that its holding does not mean that “Congress may exercise its 
power to modify the statutory scheme free of all constitutional restraint.” Id. 
at 611. And if Congress were to place entitlement obligations on the full 
faith and credit of the United States and issue written agreements promising 
to honor them, the Flemming Court’s analysis would crumble and all bets 
would be off on the applicability of the Public Debt Clause to entitlements. 
IV. Justiciability of the Public Debt Clause 
 To demonstrate that the federal courts would have jurisdiction over 
claims filed by debt-holders under the Public Debt Clause, this Part surveys 
the sovereign immunity, standing, political questions, and ripeness 
doctrines, as well as separation-of-powers considerations that overlap these 
areas. Under one view of justiciability, this separate inquiry ought not be 
required. William Fletcher has argued in the context of standing that the 
justiciability question is on the merits.208 Courts, according to Fletcher, 
should grant standing to anyone in whom the relevant constitutional or 
statutory provision sued upon grants legal rights. Similar analyses are 
possible for other prerequisites to jurisdiction;209 for example, a case would 
be ripe when a legal injury occurred under a particular provision’s definition 
of injury. Under these formulations, this Article’s justiciability analysis is 
done, because the Article conceptualizes the Public Debt Clause as investing 
legal rights against the United States in debt-holders. Thus, in this view, the 
Clause overrides sovereign immunity, grants standing, does not delegate a 
political question to a co-equal branch, creates ripe cases whenever the debt 
has been questioned, and provides a check on the legislative branch. 
 The Supreme Court has not embraced this mode of analysis. For 
example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,210 the Court held that the 
Endangered Species Act’s grant of citizen standing exceeded the bounds of 
the Article III judicial power. In nullifying an explicit congressional vesting 
of a legal right, the Court perpetuated its “injury in fact” jurisprudence.211 
This test stands in direct opposition to Fletcher’s approach, which assesses 
legal injuries instead of reading a limit to adjudicable harms into Article III. 
Thus, this Article must conduct an independent analysis of the current state 
                                                                                                                  
But the Court has so far followed Flemming, holding in 1986 that the Social Security Act 
created no contractual or property rights. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed To Social 
Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986). 
208William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988). 
209See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1427 (1987) 
(arguing that “governments have neither ‘sovereignty’ nor ‘immunity’ to violate the 
Constitution”). 
210504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
211See id. at 562–63 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1992). 
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of justiciability law to determine whether there is any remedy to those 
governmental practices that the Article brands unconstitutional. 
 This Part argues that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not 
sap the Public Debt Clause of its relevance. This discussion inevitably veers 
from the Clause’s core, but its conclusions underscore that the private rights 
protected by the Clause provide a means to enforcing public values. 
Justiciability doctrines may well endanger many constitutional challenges to 
the Congress’s administration of fiscal policy,212 but the Public Debt 
Clause’s protection of debt-holders provides an anchor on which jurisdiction 
rests comfortably. Although Part III is motivated by the concern that 
financial mismanagement may impair the general welfare, it is not this 
diffuse interest but rather the specific financial injury potentially suffered by 
debt-holders that leads to its conclusions. The Public Debt Clause paves the 
road to judicial enforcement by conferring rights in a class of individuals 
whose financial interests are aligned with the social interest of sound 
financial management that motivates this Article. 
A. Sovereign Immunity 
 Waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed,213 but 
Congress’s grants of waivers would cover an action by debt-holders. First, 
the Tucker Act214 granted the sovereign’s clear permission to be sued for 
money damages on an express contract. Indeed, in Perry v. United States,215 
the Supreme Court held that the Claims Court would have had jurisdiction 
were the petitioner’s calculations of damages correct, but that it could not 
take jurisdiction over claims for nominal damages.216 Therefore, if the 
government were to repudiate a bond debt, or another debt founded on an 
express contract, a debt-holder could sue the United States for damages. 
Second, the United States has consented to suits for relief for other than 
money damages, as long as the suit is nominally filed against an agency or 
an official.217 A debt-holder could therefore file for declaratory judgment218 
                                                 
212See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 2052 
(D.D.C. July 3, 1996) (denying standing in challenge to Line Item Veto Act); Crosthwait, 
supra note 10 (arguing that Balanced Budget Amendment would be nonjusticiable); Ondrea 
D. Riley, Comment, Annual Federal Deficit Spending: Sending the Judiciary to the Rescue, 
34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 594–601 (1994) (assessing standing barriers to challenges of 
debt accumulation, without considering Public Debt Clause). 
213See, e.g., Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (requiring courts to 
“construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign”). 
214Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 
1491(a)(1) (1996)). 
215294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
216Id. at 355. 
217See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1996). 
218See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 (1996). 
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against the Treasury. A taxpayer might, for example, seek a declaration that 
the federal debt-limit statute or other statute constituting a “debt 
questioning” is unconstitutional, without violating the United States’s 
sovereign immunity. 
 The more difficult question is whether the United States would have 
sovereign immunity if Congress passed a statute withdrawing its consent to 
suit. In the context of the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause, the 
Court has stated that “it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for 
interference with property rights amounting to a taking” and thus waives 
sovereign immunity.219 The Court could apply similar reasoning to the 
Public Debt Clause, or could read the Clause in tandem with the Just 
Compensation Clause to require compensation for debt repudiations. Indeed, 
the Perry Court suggested that there might be some limit on Congress’s 
power to make an end-run around the United States’s duty to fulfill its credit 
obligations.220 This suggestion recognizes that a key justification of 
sovereign immunity--“that there can be no legal right as against the 
authority that makes the law on which the right depends”221--does not apply 
to constitutional provisions in general and to the Public Debt Clause in 
particular, since the Clause’s purpose is to bind Congress to its earlier 
commitments. However, in the only case to consider whether Congress may 
withdraw its consent to suit in a case arising under the Clause, the Court of 
Claims held that sovereign immunity did protect such a withdrawal.222 
                                                 
219First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 
n.9 (1987). 
220See Perry, 294 U.S. at 353 (“The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is 
endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with 
the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the 
people to override their will as thus declared.”). Later language makes the import of this 
statement unclear. See id. at 354 (“While the Congress is under no duty to provide remedies 
through the courts, the contractual obligation still exists and, despite infirmities of procedure, 
remains binding upon the conscience of the sovereign.”) 
221Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.). 
222Gold Bondholders Protective Council, Inc. v. United States, 676 F.2d 643 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 
The case was a delayed Gold Clause action concerning a 1918 bond. After Perry v. United 
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), the Congress had withdrawn its consent to be sued in cases 
arising under the gold clause provisions of U.S. securities. See 31 U.S.C. § 773b (1983). The 
court noted, “In an unbroken line of decisions, it has been held that Congress may withdraw 
its consent to sue the Government at any time,” and interpreted dicta in Perry as implying 
that the Public Debt Clause did not affect this principle. 676 F.2d at 646. But cf. Fitzpatrick 
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment overrides sovereign 
immunity of states under Eleventh Amendment); analogously, the courts could hold that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause overrides the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity. 
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B. Standing 
 Although the Supreme Court’s approach to standing is at best 
confused,223 debt-holders almost certainly have the concrete interest in 
relevant aspects of government fiscal management that the general public 
lacks. In Allen v. Wright,224 Justice O’Connor noted that “application of the 
constitutional standing requirement [cannot be] a mechanical exercise,” but 
stated that the injury alleged must be “distinct and palpable,” “traceable to 
the challenged action,” and “not ‘abstract’ or ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’” Repudiation of debts creates a direct and substantial injury, 
so a challenge to such repudiation would clear these Allen hurdles. 
Moreover, even restrictive standing decisions have required only that the 
plaintiff “personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury.”225 
Therefore, the possibility of injury from, for example, the federal debt-limit 
statute would be sufficient to allow debt-holders standing to sue on the 
theory that a debt has been questioned. 
 A counterargument would equate bondholder standing with 
taxpayer standing. The government obtains revenue both by borrowing and 
taxation, so, the argument concludes, bondholders should not have standing 
where taxpayers would lack it. This argument misses a critical distinction 
between bondholders and taxpayers: Bondholders, in addition perhaps to the 
satisfaction of helping fund government programs that may benefit them, 
have a right to a return on the money they provide. Bondholders would have 
no greater right than taxpayers to challenge the situation in Allen, in which 
parents of black school children were concerned that the IRS granting of 
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools would adversely affect 
their children’s ability to receive an education. Bondholders would have 
standing, however, to challenge any policy that threatened to burden them 
with a financial loss, just as taxpayers have standing to attack the 
constitutionality of tax laws imposing burdens on them. Like such 
taxpayers, bondholders may well be concerned less about their financial 
well-being than about the state of constitutional law and government 
financial management, but public-spiritedness has never deprived a plaintiff 
with a concrete interest in a case’s outcome of standing. 
                                                 
223Compare Flast v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 83 (1968) (allowing taxpayer standing to challenge of 
government spending in Establishment Clause case), with Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying 
standing in similar case). 
224468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
225Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U.S. 91, 99 (1979)) (emphasis added).  
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C. Political Questions 
 The political question prong of justiciability bars adjudication of 
constitutional questions where there is “a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; 
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it . . . .”226 A requirement that “Congress shall ensure the validity of the 
public debt” might be a delegation of the constitutional issue to Congress, 
but the passive language of the Public Debt Clause suggests that all the 
branches of government share the responsibility of ensuring that the debt not 
be questioned. In addition, although the language of the Public Debt Clause 
does not eliminate ambiguity, this Article outlines manageable standards for 
interpreting it.227 Certainly the Clause is no less conducive to the adoption of 
judicial standards than are other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
which the courts have added a thick gloss. 
D. Ripeness 
 The ripeness doctrine’s “basic rationale is to prevent the courts, 
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in 
abstract disagreements . . . .”228 Government default is not required to make 
a disagreement concrete; a debt questioning will do. If a governmental 
action is found to be a debt questioning under an objective test, then the 
action has increased the risk of default and thus lowered the value of debt, 
decreasing the wealth of debt-holders. If a subjective test identifies a debt 
questioning, then the public is suspicious of a debt’s validity and the debt 
will thus be harder to sell. Either way, a debt questioning inflicts a financial 
injury. While debtholders may be less concerned about these small injuries 
than about the possibility of greater injury in the future, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that immediate, collateral injuries are sufficient to make 
cases justiciable.229  
E. Separation of Powers 
 Separation-of-powers considerations provide perhaps the most 
formidable obstacle to the Public Debt Clause. These considerations have 
independent significance, but have also been folded into the standing and 
political questions inquiries. For example, in Valley Forge, the Court noted 
                                                 
226Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
227See supra Subsection II.B.4. 
228Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). 
229See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978) (finding ripe 
suit challenging constitutionality of law limiting liability in event of nuclear accident, 
because presence of plant would lead to additional, immediate environmental injury). 
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that a plaintiff may have standing only if a federal court is capable of 
dispensing relief consistent with the separation of powers.230 Also bounded 
up with separation of powers are “prudential questions” about the wisdom of 
judicial involvement in a particular area, though this may have lost vitality 
as an independent doctrine.231 
 Separation-of-powers questions require analysis of whether the 
courts have the power to order a remedy. Invocation of the Public Debt 
Clause to invalidate a debt repudiation or the federal debt-limit statute 
would be an unremarkable exercise of the judicial “duty . . . to say what the 
law is.”232 The application of the Clause to excessive debt accumulation is 
more troubling. While the courts might issue a mandamus ordering that the 
deficit be lowered, congressional defiance of such an order would leave the 
courts without recourse, since rewriting a budget is a quintessentially 
legislative task that inevitably implicates economic value judgments other 
than debt reduction.233 One solution would be to resolve such cases by 
granting only money damages; bondholders would be compensated for any 
decline in the value of their bonds attributable to debt questioning. This 
approach is workable, but perhaps not a vindication of the Public Debt 
Clause’s values. First, it would exacerbate debt accumulation and thus lead 
to increased questioning of the remaining portion of the debt. Second, 
without some form of injunctive relief, it would allow unconstitutional debt 
accumulation to continue. 
 Passage of a debt-reduction statute pursuant to § 4 and § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment234 would allay separation-of-powers concerns. First, 
if Congress were to pass a statute tying its hands, later judicial enforcement 
of this Congress’s will against the will of a future Congress would be less 
countermajoritarian than garden-variety judicial review. The enforcement 
would be consistent with the will of a Congress and would reflect the 
people’s desire to create time-inconsistent policies, i.e. policies that produce 
optimal results ex ante only by precluding later exercise of policymaking 
discretion.235 Second, such a statute could mitigate the difficulty of crafting 
                                                 
230454 U.S. at 473-74; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of 
Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea--the idea of separation of powers.”); 
Crosthwait, supra note 10, at 1107 n.31. But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) 
(asserting that separation-of-powers is part of political questions inquiry but not standing). 
231See Crosthwait, supra note 10, at 1089 (arguing that “prudential doctrine is so ill-defined 
that it is of little use to courts faced with difficult justiciability questions”). But see Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (maintaining that political 
questions doctrine derives “in large part from prudential concerns about the respect we owe 
the political departments”). 
232Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
233Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Constitution does not prefer certain economic policies over others).  
234See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
235See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
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a judicial remedy. By providing a congressionally approved sequestration 
method, a statute pursuant to § 4 and § 5 would provide a default rule that 
judges could return to if a later statute were held to breach the Public Debt 
Clause. 
V. Conclusion 
 Although the Public Debt Clause is underdeveloped, it is not a 
constitutional relic. The language and history of the Clause indicate that it 
was not merely a prohibition on the repudiation of Civil War bonds. Rather, 
the Clause was and is a promise that Congress will pay its debts. The Clause 
applies at least to governmental promises embodied in written agreements 
with debt-holders, and Congress cannot take any action making it possible 
that the government will break such promises. As a result, not only would a 
governmental failure during a budget impasse to make bond or other debt 
payments be unconstitutional, but the federal debt-limit statute making such 
an impasse possible is also invalid. Moreover, Congress cannot indulge in 
unsustainable debt accumulation, and it may be able to ensure the debt’s 
validity by passing debt-reduction legislation that it could not easily repeal. 
While Congress probably may exercise its reserved right to repudiate its 
entitlement promises, it might secure those promises by invoking the Public 
Debt Clause. Suits by debt-holders to enforce the Clause would be 
justiciable. 
 Perhaps this interpretation of the Public Debt Clause and its 
application reflect only the Constitution that was at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption and the Constitution that might have 
been in the time since. But to some extent it has also described the 
Constitution that has been. For although the Supreme Court has not 
developed the Public Debt Clause, it has strained to find its core elsewhere. 
The Court has read a version of the Contracts Clause, which applies only to 
states, into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,236 though the Public 
Debt Clause seems textually like a better hinge for this holding. And the 
Court has recognized that statutes may vest recipients of government 
benefits with property interests that cannot be taken away without 
                                                                                                                  
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977). Professors Kydland and 
Prescott show that optimal control theory may not apply to dynamic economic systems. In 
other words, when expectations of future policy influence policy effectiveness, a time-
inconsistent policy, i.e. one that prevents policymakers from taking the optimal path at each 
point in time, may be ex ante optimal. This insight is relevant to debt because a government 
that can tie its own hands through time-inconsistent policy changes expectations and reaps 
the lower interest-rate benefits of higher confidence in its bond issues. See also Guillermo A. 
Calvo, Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 647 (1988) 
(arguing that expectation of debt repudiation makes such repudiation more likely). 
236See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613 (2d ed. 1988). 
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procedural due process.237 These efforts recognize an attractive principle: 
The Government should not be able to ignore its promises. 
 This Article asks that the courts use the Public Debt Clause to 
amplify this principle in the context of congressional budgeting. Although 
the courts have shown no proclivity to move in this direction, they have not 
been given the opportunity. Either a suit by bondholders or a decision by 
Congress to invoke the Clause directly would provide a test case that the 
courts might use to resuscitate this Clause. And so perhaps this Article has 
done more than excoriate Congress and the courts for not ensuring the 
government’s fiscal honor; perhaps it has offered a vision of the Fiscal 
Constitution that might still be. 
                                                 
237See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
